

Are Minorities Underrepresented in Government Policy? Racial Disparities in Responsiveness at the Congressional District Level

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Abstract

The expectation in a representative democracy is that the preferences of the public should influence the voting behavior of elected officials in Congress. Most scholars agree that this is indeed the case, but they have recently begun to ask whose opinions are most influential. Members of Congress seem to disproportionately represent the interests of copartisans and affluent Americans. The literature speaks less to the nature of the relationship between the political preferences of ethnoracial minorities and the voting behavior of members of Congress. Is there also a racial disparity in representation, even after accounting for partisanship and income? Are White Americans better represented in government decisions than are African Americans and Latinos? This paper explores the relationship between congressional district-level public opinion on proposed bills, broken down by racial, partisan, and income group, and the roll call votes of House members on those same bills. I find evidence of overresponsiveness by members of Congress to copartisan and high-income constituents, and underresponsiveness to Blacks. In some cases, minorities' preferences are underrepresented even by representatives of their own parties, on race-targeted policies, and in majority-minority districts.

Keywords: Responsiveness; Race, Ethnicity, and Politics; Inequality; Public Opinion

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1 Introduction

An extensive body of research in American politics has examined the relationship between the policy preferences of the public and the policies adopted by decision-makers in the national and state governments. Most of these studies "show opinion affecting policy regardless of how opinion, policy, and the relationship between them is measured" (Burstein, 2003; Shapiro, 2011). Representatives are responsive to expressions of public opinion because they have an electoral incentive to appeal to voter preferences (Mayhew, 1974). A growing number of public opinion scholars, however, have recently begun to ask whose opinions are most influential. One group of scholars has explored income-based disparities in responsiveness in light of increasing economic inequality in the U.S. These scholars have found that policymakers disproportionately respond to the preferences of wealthy Americans (Bartels, 2008; Branham et al., 2017; Gilens, 2012; Gilens and Page, 2014). Another group of scholars holds that legislators are most responsive to the preferences of copartisans (Kastellec et al., 2015). This is especially true when both class-based and partisan distortions in representation are considered simultaneously (Lax et al., 2019). Another challenge to the class-based account comes from scholars who have examined race-based disparities (Griffin and Newman, 2008). Griffin et al. (2019), for instance, consider the relative contributions of race and class to government responsiveness. They find that race shapes responsiveness more regularly than class.

Recent work, then, has examined class and partisan responsiveness on the one hand, or class and racial responsiveness on the other. The emerging consensus is that affluent influence is overstated. In spite of sharing this common ground, the race- and party-based accounts make up two separate and distinct bodies of literature. This paper attempts to bridge that gap by asking, do members of Congress respond to the demands of the White population more than to the demands of racial minority groups *within their parties*? Are there racial disparities in responsiveness even after accounting for both income and party? I integrate the three types of distortions and assess whether any racial biases in representation remain.

A precondition of political inequality—or unequal responsiveness, more specifically—is that groups must hold different preferences over the actions they wish government to take. If groups shared the same preferences, decision-makers would represent *all* groups even if representatives' actions were only intended to reflect the preferences of *one* group. Studies of unequal responsiveness by income have found that the preferences of individuals along the income distribution actually converge on many policy issues (Bhatti and Erikson, 2011). It is possible, then, that racial minorities receive coincidental representation due to the alignment of their preferences with those of Whites (Enns, 2015). If this were the case, it would be unnecessary to be concerned about differential responsiveness. I therefore first identify and describe the policy issues in which the preferences of Whites, Latinos, and African Americans converge and those in which they diverge.

One challenge in studying racial disparities in representation is that we often lack good measures of minority opinion at subnational levels of aggregation (Hajnal, 2009). When opinion measures from national surveys are sliced by subconstituency (e.g., income or racial group), the sample sizes become too small. The ideology estimates, therefore, are often measured with a great deal of error (Bhatti and Erikson, 2011). The same is true for state or district samples broken down by racial group, which are sometimes as small as 50 individuals per state (Griffin and Newman, 2008). Even when using this 50-person threshold, roughly half the states are left out of the sample for lack of enough minority respondents in the samples. This problem extends to the study of other jurisdictions, such as congressional and state legislative districts. Thus, we need an accurate measure of subnational policy preferences broken down by subconstituency.

To achieve this goal, I estimate congressional district-level opinion on specific policy issues using data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. The CCES is a national sample survey ($N = 50,000+$) that asks respondents about their general political attitudes, demographic and geographic factors (such as respondents' congressional district), partisan affiliation, and assessments of legislators' roll call voting choices. I employ multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP)¹ to estimate opinion at the congressional district level. This exercise produces a rich

¹This technique allows researchers to generate highly accurate estimates of subnational opinion from national polls and demographic-geographic models (Gelman and Little, 1997; Lax and Phillips, 2009, 2012; Park et al., 2006).

set of descriptive data that are not readily available, due in part to the relatively small sample sizes within each district in most national surveys. MRP allows me to estimate, for each of the 435 congressional districts, the proportion of Whites, Blacks, and Latinos who support 44 policy changes over a ten-year period. In line with previous studies, I find greater racial gaps between the political attitudes of Whites and Blacks than those between Whites and Latinos (Dawson, 1995; De La Garza and Yang, 2019; Griffin and Newman, 2008; Leal, 2007).

It is important to note, though, that the observed racial gaps in opinion may be explained, at least in part, by partisanship or income. Black opinion, for example, might be synonymous with Democratic opinion. I implement the MRP extension devised by Kestellec et al. (2015) to disentangle race and party, and expand the dataset to include the proportion of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans in each congressional district that support each policy change. I am thus able to estimate the opinion of each racial-partisan group (e.g., White Democrats, Latino Republicans). Some of the previously observed racial disparities in opinion disappear once I take partisanship into account, but many remain. Blacks and Whites, for instance, still disagree over affirmative action programs, even within the same party. Furthermore, differences in opinion between pairs of ethnoracial groups remain virtually unchanged across income categories.

Next, I examine the degree to which group preferences are reflected in legislators' vote choices for those issue domains in which racial gaps exist *within* parties. After setting aside those preferences that are shared across racial groups, I ask: What is the association between Congress members' voting behavior and the preferences of their White, Black, and Latino copartisans? I use roll call votes on House bills as a dependent variable in these analyses. The selected bills match the CCES survey items closely; both the independent and dependent variables are thus measured on the same scale. I then select a subset of the resulting 75 unique opinion-vote dyads that follow a temporal sequence; opinion was measured prior to the date of the House vote in 25 of the 75 cases.

Evidence for claims about unequal responsiveness has largely been based on analyses in which the independent variables are White/Black/Latino opinion, Democratic/Republican opin-

ion, *or* wealthy/middle class/poor opinion—or, in select cases, a combination of two of those three dimensions—and the dependent variable is a measure of policymaking. The main contribution of this paper is to simultaneously account for all three dimensions: race, party, and income. This paper also demonstrates the multiple ways in which one may conduct such an analysis. Assume, for example, that we use representatives' votes as the dependent variable and we stratify the data by representatives' partisanship. Assume further that we are interested in examining the voting behavior of Democratic legislators. Would we reach similar conclusions if we used White-Democratic-poor/Black-Democratic-poor/Latino-Democratic-poor opinion as independent variables, rather than just White/Black/Latino opinion or even White-Democratic/Black-Democratic/Latino-Democratic opinion? Using MRP to generate opinion estimates thus allows me to analyze the data with more nuance, which in turn leads to more refined conclusions than had been previously possible.

My findings suggest that members of the House are most responsive to copartisan and high-income constituents. Even after accounting for overresponsiveness to these groups, however, small but significant racial disparities remain. Blacks' preferences are sometimes underrepresented even in majority-minority districts and on race-targeted social policies. Latino opinion, on the other hand, is positively related to legislators' voting behavior in some cases. In others, as is the case of immigration, there is no relationship between Latino opinion and legislators' roll call votes. These results hold even in congressional districts in which Whites make up a minority of the population.

Does this mean, then, that Whites and minorities are politically unequal? Judging by the proportionality standard of political equality, yes. My findings suggest that group influence is not necessarily proportional to the group's numerical strength. I find evidence of unequal responsiveness even in districts where racial minorities make up the majority of the population. In addition, minorities are no better represented on policy issues that they care about more than Whites do (e.g., affirmative action and immigration).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I situate the paper in the literatures on unequal responsiveness and race and representation. Next, in section 3, I describe the CCES

data, outline the methodological approach (MRP), and explain how the variables are measured. Sections 4 and 5 present the descriptive and inferential results, respectively. Finally, I conclude in section 6 with a discussion of the implications and future directions of this research.

2 Theory

2.1 Unequal Responsiveness

At least since Miller and Stokes' (1963) seminal study on the influence of constituency opinion on Congress, political scientists have studied the link between public opinion and both the behavior of elected officials and the content of public policy. Most of these studies—whether conducted at the national level (Page and Shapiro, 1983), at the state level (Erikson et al., 1993; Lax and Phillips, 2012), or looking at specific policy issues (Agnone, 2007; Arceneaux, 2002; Backstrom, 1977; Bartels, 1991)—find an association between what constituents want from government and what their representatives do while in office, especially when it comes to salient issues.

In recent years, some argue, the level of responsiveness has declined (Shapiro, 2011). There is a growing concern that representation is becoming more unequal as economic inequality in the United States rises. Gilens (2012), for example, finds that the relationship between preferences and policy outcomes is stronger for higher-income Americans. When there *is* an association between the views of lower-income citizens (over a range of issues) and policy, it is usually in cases in which the views of the poor happen to coincide with those of the affluent. Similarly, Bartels (2008, 5) finds that "the opinions of millions of ordinary citizens in the bottom third of the income distribution have no discernible impact on the behavior of their elected representatives." By the same token, Ellis (2017) finds that the more affluent members of the public receive better policy representation because they are closer in ideology to their representatives in Congress.

Critics of the class-based account contend that affluent influence is overstated because (1) poor and middle-class constituents receive a great deal of coincidental representation from the

wealthy (Enns, 2015), and (2) correcting some of the opinion measures weakens the evidence of elite influence (Bhatti and Erikson, 2011). A consensus seems to be emerging in more recent work; other factors, namely race and partisanship, may better explain the observed inequalities in responsiveness.

Recent research has shown that unequal responsiveness is not necessarily an issue of the haves versus the have-nots. [Warshaw \(2012\)](#), for example, finds that lawmakers are more responsive to their copartisans when they cast their roll call votes in Congress. In their study of confirmation voting on Supreme Court nominations, [Kastellec et al. \(2015\)](#) find that the opinion of legislators' copartisans matters more than the opinion of the median voter—that is, Democratic legislators listen more to Democratic constituents and Republican legislators listen more to Republican constituents. This line of research also suggests that Democrats and Republicans respond to opinion differently, with Republicans being more likely to privilege the preferences of their copartisans ([Warshaw, 2012](#)). [Lax et al. \(2019\)](#) are the first to simultaneously combine both economic and partisan biases in representation. They find that affluent influence is contingent on partisanship and conclude that "Republican partisanship is the key to understanding modern affluent influence."

In addition to partisan bias in responsiveness, there is some evidence that race is an important factor for achieving equal representation. [Griffin and Newman \(2008\)](#) show that White Americans' preferences carry more weight in legislators' voting decisions in Congress, as well as in the ultimate content of public policy. The advantage Whites have over minorities in this regard holds even in some cases where the latter make up a larger proportion of electoral districts. Another example is [Butler and Broockman's \(2011\)](#) experiment, in which they explore whether race affects how responsive state legislators are to requests for help with registering to vote. The results suggest that White legislators are more likely to respond to White constituents, whereas minority legislators are more likely to respond to Black constituents. In a similar fashion to the work of [Lax et al. \(2019\)](#), [Griffin et al. \(2019\)](#) examine the relative contributions of race and class to government responsiveness. They analyze the relationship between spending preferences and actual federal spending on a dozen issue areas and find that race shapes government responsiveness more regularly

than class. Blacks are consistently the most disadvantaged. The authors note that "race has the largest single impact on who government responds to. The effect of race on government responsiveness is more than twice the effect of income."

This paper builds on the unequal responsiveness literature to assess the relative influence of race, class, and party on legislators' voting behavior. Accounting for partisanship provides stronger evidence as to whether members of Congress are indeed more likely to respond to the preferences of White Americans over those of African Americans and Latinos. In order to ascertain how well a minority group is represented, scholars typically rely on one of two measures: descriptive representation or substantive representation. While the former is concerned with the number of elected officials by group in a governing body, the latter focuses instead on whether the policies enacted by elected officials are in line with minorities' interests. One challenge that scholars of substantive representation have faced in the past is the dearth of data on *both* minority preferences (at subnational levels of aggregation) and government actions on specific policy decisions. As [Hajnal \(2009, 40\)](#) notes, "we sometimes have good measures of policy outcomes but we rarely have good measures of minority views on those specific policies. The result is that studies of substantive representation tend to focus on a specific locality and a single policy choice." As a result, scholars have gauged the quality of minority representation using varied approaches, such as counting the number of individuals in each racial group who vote for a candidate that loses an election ([Hajnal, 2009](#)), or comparing the ideological proximity of Latinos and Whites to their members of Congress ([Griffin and Newman, 2007](#)). These studies consistently find that ethnoracial minorities are underrepresented in American politics.

2.2 Studying the Opinion-Policy Link at the Subnational Level

Studying the opinion-policy link at the subnational level (e.g., in states, congressional districts, state legislative districts, or cities) has been particularly difficult in the past due to the fact that the sample sizes in national surveys are usually too small to make inferences at low levels of geographic aggregation. [Griffin and Newman \(2008\)](#), for instance, analyze data from the 2000

National Annenberg Election Survey. Even though the sample includes 57,197 respondents—more than 5,000 Blacks and more than 5,000 Latinos—some states have fewer than 50 respondents who are members of minority groups. Thus, some of the inferences are based on estimates measured with a great deal of error.

This paper explores whether the voting behavior of individual legislators equally reflects the preferences of their White, Black, and Latino constituents. Answering this question requires a measure of each district's preferences broken down by racial group. Following [Warshaw and Rodden \(2012\)](#), I employ the multilevel regression and poststratification approach (MRP) developed by [Gelman and Little \(1997\)](#) and [Park et al. \(2006\)](#). As explained by [Warshaw and Rodden \(2012, 203\)](#),

(MRP) incorporates demographic and geographic information to improve survey-based estimates of each geographic unit's public opinion on individual issues. First, the model incorporates both demographic and geographic information to partially pool data across districts. Next, predictions are made for each demographic-geographic respondent type. Finally, these predictions are poststratified (weighted) using Census data.

I expand [Warshaw and Rodden's \(2012\)](#) approach to develop estimates of district-level public opinion by subconstituency—a legislators' White, Black, and Latino constituents. One important advantage of MRP that [Warshaw and Rodden \(2012\)](#) highlight is that it produces reliable estimates of congressional districts' public opinion even from a single national sample of just 2,500 people. I use every available year of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (2006-2016), which has a national sample of over 50,000 respondents.

2.3 Hypotheses

Employing this research design will ultimately shed light on the extent to which members of different ethnoracial groups enjoy political equality. Suppose that the political preferences of Whites and minorities differ and that minorities are in the numerical minority. Now suppose, however, that politicians can choose to represent the preferences of minorities in many different ways while still remaining in office (Fenno, 2003). Do politicians simply represent the preferences of Whites in the numerical majority? Do they represent the preferences of minorities as much as possible while still retaining electoral success? Or do politicians enact pro-minority policies irrespective of the preferences of their constituents because of some normative commitment? In order to answer these questions, I follow Griffin and Newman (2008) in considering three standards of political equality: proportionality, egalitarianism, and pluralism.

Best explained by the "one person, one vote" adage, the *proportionality standard* suggests that all groups influence a decision in proportion to their numerical strength. An empirical implication of this standard of equality is that racial minorities should be equally represented, when compared with Whites, in jurisdictions where national minorities comprise a majority of the population (H_1). As opposed to the individual-centric proportionality standard, *race-conscious egalitarianism*, the second standard of political equality, conceives of equality in group terms. The argument is that African Americans and Latinos are two groups that have been historically and systematically disadvantaged in American politics and society; consequently, these groups merit equal treatment even if the proportion of African Americans and Latinos in a jurisdiction is smaller than that of Whites (H_2). Finally, *pluralism* holds that there must be multiple centers of power and, as such, minorities should be represented in government decisions—even when they are outnumbered by Whites—on policy issues that they value more than Whites (H_3). In light of these three conceptions of racial equality, I aim to assess the degree to which racial minorities are politically equal to Whites in having their preferences acted upon in Congress.

3 Data and Methods

3.1 Estimating District-Level Opinion

In order to explore the relationship between subconstituency opinion (the independent variable) and roll call voting in the U.S. House of Representatives (the dependent variable), I first estimate opinion by ethnoracial group across more than ten issue areas covered by the CCES: immigration, LGBTQ+ rights, foreign policy, affirmative action, financial/fiscal policy, stem cell research, health care, education, environmental protection, reproductive rights (including abortion), gun control, and transportation. I employ MRP to estimate public opinion by ethnoracial group at the congressional district level. The first stage of MRP involves modeling individual survey responses as a function of demographic and geographic predictors. For this step I use the Cooperative Congressional Election Study ($N \approx 50,000+$) for each even year between 2006 and 2016. These surveys not only contain questions about general political attitudes and demographic factors, but they also include information on the congressional district in which respondents live, as well as their opinions on specific and timely congressional bills. After gathering all the policy-specific survey items (see Table 8 in Appendix B), I then match these with corresponding House bills. The result is an original dataset of 75 opinion-bill pairs.

I use policy-specific survey items as a measure of public opinion, as opposed to an aggregate ideological index, because the latter can mask differences across issue areas. Latinos, for example, may hold "conservative" views on abortion but "liberal" views on immigration; an aggregate index would not distinguish between the two. The fact that using issue-specific measures allows me to assess how opinion varies by policy type is also particularly important when studying the policy preferences of ethnoracial minorities vis-à-vis the preferences of the White majority. Some policies affect minorities disproportionately or are specifically designed to compensate for discrimination and improve the conditions of their communities. It is theoretically important to examine legislators' responsiveness to their constituents' opinions regarding these race-conscious policies. An aggregate ideological index would not permit such an analysis.

In contrast to other studies of unequal responsiveness (e.g., [Gilens, 2012](#)), I use roll call votes as the dependent variable instead of actual policy outcomes. The decisions that legislators make about policies, and even the power that members of Congress have in determining which policies are considered in the first place, make up an important aspect of responsiveness. Furthermore, the bills that make it to the floor of Congress are the ones that are most visible to voters and, consequently, the ones on which members of Congress have the greatest incentive to heed the desires of their constituents. Finally, using both issue-specific survey items that ask about real-world bills and MCs' votes on those same bills provides for an independent variable that is measured on the same scale as the dependent variable.

Using these data, I then estimate each individual's preferences as a function of his or her demographic profile (race, gender, education, income, and age)² and congressional district. This approach allows individual-level demographic factors and geography to contribute to our understanding of district ideology ([Warshaw and Rodden, 2012](#)). The district effects, in turn, are modeled as a function of the district's median income, the percentage of people in each district that are military veterans, the percentage of households that speak a language other than English at home, and the percentage of same-sex households in each district.

The second stage is poststratification, which entails weighting the estimates for each demographic-geographic respondent type by the percentage of each type in the actual district populations. This adds up to the percentage of respondents within each district who have a particular position. There are 435 districts with 360 demographic types in each—ranging from *White-male-less than high school-low income-age 18-29* to *Latino-female-graduate degree-high income-age 65+*—which yields 156,600 possible combinations of demographic and district values. For each cell I calculate the relevant population frequency, and then use this frequency to weigh the prediction in each cell. Since the Census Factfinder only includes data breakdowns by race, gender, and education, I use population frequencies from Public Use Micro Data Samples to also account for age. These

²Race uses three categories: White, Black, and Latino. Gender uses two categories: male and female. Education uses five categories: less than high school, high school degree, some college, college degree, and postgraduate degree. Income uses three: \$0-\$29,999, \$30,000-\$79,999, and \$80,000-\$150,000+. Age uses four: 18-29, 30-44, 45-64, and 65+.

PUMS-level frequencies are also supplied by the Census Bureau; I convert them to congressional districts using the Missouri Census Data Center's Geographic Correspondence Engine (geocorr2k) (Krimmel et al., 2016).

One challenge to "standard" MRP is that Census data do not include partisan identification. I follow the method devised by [Kastellec et al. \(2015\)](#), which involves using an additional stage of MRP, to account for individuals' partisanship. Using survey data on three-point partisan identification from the CCES (i.e., whether a respondent is a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent), I model partisanship as a function of demographic and geographic variables. In other words, this approach treats partisanship as a response variable to which standard MRP can be applied to estimate the distribution of partisanship across the full set of demographic-geographic types. This step splits the 156,600 types into a more expansive poststratification matrix, with 469,800 (156,600 x 3) partisan-demographic-geographic types ([Kastellec et al., 2015, 791](#)).³ Appendix A provides a more detailed explanation of this procedure.

This extension of MRP allows me to estimate district-level opinion by partisan group (Democrats, Republicans, and Independents), by income group (low-, middle-, and high-income), and by racial group (Whites, Blacks, and Latinos), as well as their respective combinations (e.g., White Democrats, Black Democrats, and Latino Democrats; low-income Whites, low-income Blacks, low-income Latinos; middle-income Democratic Whites, middle-income Democratic Blacks, middle-income Democratic Latinos). Using this method, for example, I am able to compare White and Black opinion within each party, as opposed to White and Black opinion across Democratic congressional districts and Republican congressional districts.

³For example, the frequency of White males, aged 18 – 29 with annual income less than \$30,000 and educated up to the high school level in the district AK0 is 112. The estimated proportion of Democrats, Independents and Republicans is approximately 0.3417, 0.339 and 0.3193. Hence, the estimated proportion of Democratic, White males, aged 18 – 29, with annual income less than \$30,000 and high-school educated in the district AK0 is approximately 38.2703. One can analogously estimate the same frequencies for Independents and Republicans, too, which are approximately 37.966 and 35.7637.

3.2 Measurement

I use 44 unique⁴ survey questions asked during a ten-year period (2006-2016) in the CCES to measure individual-level public opinion. I include in the dataset only those survey items for which matching House bills exist. This method results in a total of 75 opinion-vote dyads. Table 8 in Appendix B shows a full list of questions, categorized by issue area. The MRP method described in the previous section yields an independent variable that describes the proportion of White, Black, Latino, Democratic, Independent, Republican, low-income, middle-income, and high-income individuals—as well as all the possible combinations of race, party, and income—in each congressional district that favor each of those 44 policy changes.

For each question, survey respondents indicated whether they favored (coded as 1) or opposed (coded as 0) the proposed bill. Similarly, representatives voted "Yea" (coded as 1) or "Nay" (coded as 0) on the same bills. Both variables are thus measured on the same scale. Before exploring the relationship between the two variables, the next section presents descriptive statistics on the independent variable for all six congresses in the dataset.

4 Do the Opinions of Whites, Blacks, and Latinos Differ?

It would be infeasible to assess to which racial group members of Congress are more responsive if the policy preferences of White, Black, and Latino constituents were aligned. For policies that generate comparable levels of support across different racial groups, the opinion-vote link is necessarily the same irrespective of race (Gilens, 2012). Identifying the policy issues on which there is disagreement between members of different racial groups is a necessary condition for assessing legislators' responsiveness. In this section, I describe racial differences in public opinion estimated via MRP. Figure 1 presents the mean level of support for each bill-specific survey item across the

⁴There are 44 *unique* bill-specific survey items in the 2006-2016 CCES. Some of these are repeated more than once through the years, and are thus matched with different bills based on their temporal sequence. For example, I match the 2012 survey item on attitudes toward repealing the Affordable Care Act with H.R.45. The 2016 survey includes the same item, but this time I match it with H.R.1628. This procedure results in 75 opinion-vote dyads.

three racial groups in each of the three partisanship categories and the three income categories for the years 2006 to 2016. Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix C present this information in tabular form. Tables 11 and 12 in Appendix D show the mean level of White, Black, and Latino support for each policy *within* each party. As Figure 1 shows (comparing the columns), racial differences in opinion vary little, if at all, across income categories. The issues included in Figure 1 are those for which there are matching House bills and for which opinion was measured prior to the date of the House vote.

4.1 Racial Differences in Opinion

4.1.1 Immigration

Immigration policy is the issue on which the preferences of Whites and Latinos differ the most. The CCES asked respondents in 2006 and 2012 whether they would support a policy that would offer illegal immigrants who already live in the U.S. more opportunities to become legal citizens. In both cases, a majority of Latinos expressed support for said policy (the mean level of support went from 55 percent in 2006 to 66 percent in 2012), while fewer than a majority of Whites (34 percent in 2006 and 43 percent in 2012) agreed. Other surveys have found similar results: even though 67 percent of Whites think illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay in the country legally, only 40 percent think those same individuals should be able to apply for citizenship (Pew, 2013). While previous research has suggested that Blacks are far more "sympathetic to the plight of immigrants than are Whites" (Doherty and Rosentiel, 2006), Black opinion on the topic of immigration does not always resemble that of Latinos more closely than that of Whites. In 2006, 40 percent of Blacks supported the bill that would grant immigrants legal status (closer to Whites' 34 percent than to Latinos' 55 percent support). In 2012, however, Black support increased to 62 percent—a lot closer to Latinos' 66 percent. Overall, there has been an increase in support for a pathway to citizenship among all groups, although support among Whites is still below 50 percent.

Figure 1: Mean Policy Support by Race within Party and Income Categories



The survey also includes questions related to punitive immigration policies. In 2012, for example, respondents were asked whether they think the government should fine businesses that hire illegal immigrants. A majority of Whites (66 percent) support this policy, while only 38 percent of Latinos do—a 28-percent difference. Black support is somewhere in the middle, at 46 percent. A 2011 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center similarly found that 72 percent of Whites, 42 percent of Blacks, and 27 percent of Latinos supported an Arizona immigration law that requires police to verify the legal status of anyone they detain (Pew, 2011). Similarly, Whites are the group with the highest rate of approval for increasing patrols along the U.S.–Mexico border (in the mid- to high-50s), followed by Blacks and finally Latinos. Support for this policy has decreased between 2012 and 2016 for all groups.

4.1.2 Affirmative Action

Affirmative action is to Whites and Blacks what immigration is to Whites and Latinos: it is the most contentious policy issue between the two racial groups. When the CEES asked about affirmative action programs—those that "give preference to racial minorities and to women in employment and college admissions in order to correct for discrimination"—in 2008, 89 percent of Blacks said they supported such programs. A less dramatic but still sizable majority of Latinos also expressed support (64 percent). Conversely, only 37 percent of Whites were in favor of affirmative action programs. A 2014 Pew Research Center survey similarly found that 84 percent of Blacks, 80 percent of Latinos, and 55 percent of Whites supported affirmative action programs to increase the number of Black and minority students on college campuses (Pew, 2014). The discrepancies in White and Latino support might be due to my use of an aggregate opinion measure (district versus individual-level data), or they might reflect changes in opinion over time. Nevertheless, affirmative action is an example of a "race-conscious" or "race-targeted" social policy. Scholars of symbolic racism have noted that many Whites hold indirect racial hostility, exemplified by claims such as "the government pays too much attention to Blacks" or "Blacks who receive welfare could get along without it if they tried," and opposition to race-targeted policies (Bobo, 2001; Henry and Sears,

2002; Sears and Henry, 2003).

4.1.3 LGBTQ+ Rights

In 2006, 44 percent of Whites, 39 percent of Latinos, and 35 percent of Blacks were in favor of a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage. The 9-point difference between Whites and Blacks on the issue of same-sex marriage did not translate to allowing "gays to serve openly in the armed forces." When the CCES asked this question in 2010, Blacks still held the more liberal opinion (similar to Latinos at 65 and 64 percent, respectively) but the margin closed to a 6-point difference; 59 percent of Whites were in favor of ending Don't Ask, Don't Tell.

4.1.4 Foreign Policy

On issues of foreign policy, Blacks hold more liberal attitudes when compared with their White counterparts. Latinos tend to fall squarely in the middle. In 2006, for example, 84 percent of Blacks were in favor of withdrawing troops from Iraq, followed by 70 percent of Latinos and 58 percent of Whites. On average, a majority of people supported this policy, but the differences between racial groups were substantial. Some of these discrepancies increased by 2008, even though overall support for the policy decreased—especially among Whites.

In 2008 there was a similarly sized difference in White and Black opinion on allowing U.S. spy agencies to eavesdrop on overseas terrorist suspects without first getting a court order. A majority of Whites (58 percent) and Latinos (53 percent) were in favor of the policy, while only 40 percent of Blacks supported it. The White-Black divide is smaller for the Iran Sanctions Act: 82 percent of Whites and 75 percent of Blacks were in favor of imposing sanctions on Iran in 2016. Support for this bill was high across the board.

The U.S.–Korea Free Trade Agreement, which would remove tariffs on imports and exports between South Korea and the U.S., did not receive widespread support. All three racial groups'

approval hovered right at or slightly below the 50-percent mark, with Blacks being slightly less supportive of the trade agreement.

4.1.5 Financial/Fiscal Policy

The CCES has included a wide array of questions on financial and fiscal policy over the ten-year period of study. In this category, the only policy that received high support from all groups was the proposal to increase the minimum wage from \$5.15 to \$6.25 in 2008; 76 percent of Whites, 89 percent of Latinos and 95 percent of Blacks supported the proposal. Even though support was high overall, it is important to note that the difference between Whites and each of the minority groups was substantial. One potential explanation is that the word "poverty" was included in the text of the question, which may have induced racialized framing effects. On other policy proposals, such as the U.S. government's \$700 billion bank bailout plan in 2008, support was a lot lower across groups—all under 30 percent on average—but highest among Blacks. Finally, the proposal to provide federal assistance for homeowners facing foreclosure and for large lending institutions at risk of failing, received mixed support in 2008. While a majority of Blacks (70 percent) and Latinos (56 percent) favored the proposal, 40 percent of Whites supported federal assistance for foreclosures.

In 2010 the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which authorized \$787 billion in federal spending to stimulate economic growth in the U.S., similarly received a great deal of support from Blacks (81 percent) and Latinos (60 percent), but less-than-majority support from Whites (46 percent). In the same year, however, Whites were considerably more supportive (65 percent) of a financial reform package to protect consumers against abusive lending, regulate high-risk investments, and allow the government to shut down failing financial institutions. Blacks' (89 percent) and Latinos' (76 percent) support remains higher than Whites' in this case.

What became known as the Ryan Budget Plan—Paul Ryan's (R-WI) "Path to Prosperity," which would cut Medicare and Medicaid by 42% and reduce the government debt by 16% by

2020—was unpopular among all groups in both 2012 and 2014. The highest level of approval it received was in 2014 when 20 percent of Latinos said they favored the proposal. The CCES also asked respondents about the Simpson-Bowles Budget Plan in 2012 and 2014. This plan included making 15% cuts across the board in Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Defense, as well as other programs; eliminating many tax breaks for individuals and corporations; and reducing debt by 21% by 2020. Support for this bipartisan effort to reduce the national debt remained well under the majority mark for all groups in both years. The differences between each pair of racial groups did not amount to more than 3 percent, with the exception of a 6-percentage-point difference between Whites and Blacks in 2012.

In contrast, the Middle Tax Cut Act, which would extend Bush-era tax cuts for incomes below \$200,000 and would increase the budget deficit by an estimated \$250 billion, received support from all groups in 2012—especially Whites (61 percent). A majority of Latinos (58 percent) and Blacks (55 percent) also supported the measure, but less strongly than Whites. The public, regardless of racial group, was a lot less supportive of the Tax Hike Prevention Act, which proposed to extend Bush-era tax cuts for all individuals, regardless of income, and would increase the budget deficit by an estimated \$405 billion. White support was the highest at 25 percent.

In 2014, when the CCES asked respondents whether they supported increasing the debt ceiling, 60 percent of Blacks agreed. Considerably fewer Whites (13 percent less) and Latinos (14 percent less) supported this measure, which allowed the U.S. government to borrow funds as needed to meet spending obligations and avoid default on U.S. government bonds.

4.1.6 Health Care

Most Americans supported the Children’s Health Insurance Program in 2008. CHIP is a \$20 billion program that provides health insurance for children in families earning less than \$43,000 a year. Blacks supported it the most (90 percent), followed by Latinos (78 percent) and Whites (61 percent). Even though a majority of all groups supported this policy, the differences between each

pair of racial groups is sizable. In 2016, the CCES asked about CHIP again but this time included Medicare access in the same question. Support decreased to the 60s for all racial groups.

The most contentious health care policy of the last decade, the Affordable Care Act, generated huge differences in support across different racial groups. In 2010, when the CCES first asked respondents whether they supported a measure that would require all Americans to obtain health insurance and increase taxes on those making more than \$280,000 a year, only 45 percent of Whites answered yes. In contrast, 62 percent of Latinos and 85 percent of Blacks indicated support for this proposal. In 2014, the CCES again asked about this policy, but this time it explicitly asked respondents whether they would have voted for the Affordable Care Act if they were in Congress. The results were similar: 45 percent of Whites, 56 percent of Latinos and 81 percent of Blacks said yes. By the same token, Whites were the most supportive of repealing the ACA in 2012 (45 percent), 2014 (54 percent), and 2016 (56 percent), even though there was never a large majority in favor of the repeal. Although Black support for repealing the ACA remained low over the years, it increased from 25 percent in 2012 and 28 percent in 2014 to 35 percent in 2016. Latino support for repealing the ACA was closer to Whites' opinion than to Blacks'.

4.1.7 Reproductive Rights

Fewer than 41 percent of Whites, 27 percent of Blacks, and 34 percent of Latinos in 2012 and 2014 supported a bill to let employers and insurers refuse to cover birth control and other health services that violate their religious beliefs. While support for this measure has been consistently low across groups, Blacks have been the most strongly opposed to it.

Just like there is widespread support for health insurance-covered birth control, more than 60 percent of Americans of all races think that abortions after the 20th week of pregnancy should be prohibited by law (CCES, 2014 and 2016). Latinos (59 percent)—compared with 54 percent of Blacks and 47 percent of Whites—are the most likely to think that abortions should only be permitted in cases of rape, incest or when the woman's life is in danger. The largest differences

in attitudes toward abortion exist for questions regarding the funding of the procedure. These differences are evident in 2014 and 2016 when the CCES asked respondents whether they were in favor of prohibiting the expenditure of funds authorized or appropriated by federal law for any abortion, and whether they were in favor of allowing employers to decline coverage of abortions in insurance plans. Black Americans were the least supportive of both of these measures (10 percent less so than Whites).

4.1.8 Environmental Protection

There are large racial disparities in attitudes toward environmental policies. In 2010, 78 percent of Blacks were in favor of imposing a cap on carbon emissions and funding research on renewable energy, compared with 68 percent of Latinos and 53 percent of Whites. Similarly, in 2014, 85 percent of Blacks and 82 percent of Latinos supported the Environmental Protection Agency's regulating carbon emissions. A sizable majority of Whites (68 percent) were also supportive of this bill.

There was less disagreement in support for approving the Keystone XL Pipeline from Montana to Texas and providing for environmental protection and government oversight in the process. All three groups were highly supportive of this bill. Similarly, there was little disagreement in support for the Environmental Protection Agency's strengthening enforcement of the Clean Air Act, even if it costs U.S. jobs. Favorability among all groups hovered around 50 percent.

4.1.9 Gun Control

On the issue of gun regulation, racial differences are small to moderate in size. Americans of all races are highly supportive of background checks. In 2014, 93 percent of Blacks, 90 percent of Latinos, and 88 percent of Whites indicated support for requiring background checks for individuals purchasing guns. Similarly, Americans of all races do not wish to make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permits. Support for this bill is highest among Whites, but low nonetheless at 40

percent. Black support is 9 percentage points lower; this is the biggest difference on the issue of gun control.

4.1.10 Stem Cell Research

Support for stem cell research decreased between 2006 and 2008 for all groups. The CCES noted that advocates of this research hold that it may lead to cures for diseases and disabilities that affect many Americans, and should therefore be funded by the federal government. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that a potential human life has to be destroyed in order to use these cells, and funding it would be unethical. When asked whether they would vote for or against federal funds for this research, Blacks were the most supportive in 2006 (68 percent), followed by Whites (61 percent) and Latinos (59 percent) who held similar opinions. In 2008, it was Blacks and Whites who exhibited similar levels of support (55 percent) and were more supportive than Latinos (50 percent in 2008). Overall, federal funding for stem cell research is not an issue that cuts across racial lines.

4.1.11 NSA Phone Surveillance

The 2014 CCES asked respondents whether they supported a bill that would block funding of the National Security Agency's program that gathers details on every phone call made by or to a U.S. phone, unless the records were part of a specific investigation. There were considerable racial disparities in the responses. Whites were the most supportive of the bill (72 percent), followed by Latinos (62 percent) and Blacks (57 percent). It is surprising that, given the history of surveillance of African American communities, this group is the least supportive of blocking funding for this program. It is possible that respondents misinterpreted the framing of the question; it is the only question framed in the negative (i.e., supporting the *blocking* of funding, as opposed to merely supporting funding). On the other hand, it could be that Blacks are indeed less supportive of this measure.

4.1.12 Education

The No Child Left Behind Act, which increased the role of the federal government in holding schools accountable for student outcomes, faced criticism from all sides of the ideological spectrum around 2015. In 2016, when the CCES asked survey respondents whether they would vote in favor of repealing NCLB, an overwhelming majority said yes. There were virtually no differences across racial groups; 78 percent of Whites, 76 percent of Blacks, and 74 percent of Latinos supported the repeal.

4.1.13 Transportation and Agriculture

There was also high approval and few racial differences in support for the Highway and Transportation Funding Act in 2016: 84 percent of Whites, 82 percent of Blacks, and 78 percent of Latinos were all in favor of the bill. There was an 8-percent difference, however, between Whites (63 percent) and Latinos (61 percent) on the one hand, and Blacks (54 percent) on the other, in support for a 2016 agriculture bill that would end price supports for corn, wheat, sugar, and other agricultural products. The proposal also included a federal subsidized crop insurance program and reauthorization of the food stamp program.

4.1.14 Discussion

Overall, White, Black, and Latino respondents are highly supportive of education reform (repealing No Child Left Behind) and federal funding of highways. In addition to these two bills, the mean differences across racial groups, conditional on partisanship, are smallest for the following bills: constitutionally banning gay marriage; ending Don't Ask, Don't Tell; prohibiting all abortions after 20 weeks of gestation; requiring background checks for firearm purchases; imposing sanctions on Iran; requiring a minimum amount of renewable fuels in the generation of electricity; and funding Medicare. The differences between Whites and Blacks are, perhaps unsurprisingly, greatest for

affirmative action (54.1-percent difference), the Affordable Care Act (39.1-percent difference), and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (35.8-percent difference).

The discrepancies in policy preferences between Whites and Blacks and between Blacks and Latinos are larger across the board than the discrepancies between Whites and Latinos. Like Blacks, Latinos are considerably more supportive of affirmative action programs (28.2-percent difference) and less supportive of punitive immigration laws (22.9-percent difference). The results shown in Figure 1 are consistent with previous studies on racial differences in opinion. [Abrajano and Poole \(2011\)](#), for instance, find that Latinos and Whites are closely aligned in their preferences regarding the role of government in society, whereas Blacks' preferences on the same topic are markedly different. African Americans as a group are more internally homogeneous in terms of their policy preferences and consistently fall to the left of Whites and Latinos on the ideological spectrum [Dawson \(1995\)](#).

In the next section, I examine the relationship between subconstituency policy preferences and legislators' roll call votes. I first consider the responsiveness of legislators to constituent preferences on all bills, and next focus on those issues for which racial differences equal to or greater than 10 percent persist after accounting for partisanship.

5 Whom Do Legislators Represent?

As mentioned in Section 3.2, I matched 44 policy-specific items from the CCES with corresponding House bills. This procedure resulted in 75 opinion-vote pairs. Out of these 75 pairs, 25 meet the criterion that opinion on the policy issue must be measured prior the date of the House vote. This attention to temporal sequences ameliorates concerns of reverse causality ([Shapiro, 2011](#)). Table 1 shows the 25 opinion-vote matches (i.e., each CCES survey item with its corresponding House bill).

Table 1: CCES Items Matched with House Bills

| Bill | Bill Title | Bill Description | Bill Status | Vote Date | Survey Item | Survey Date |
|----------|--|---|--|-----------|--|-------------|
| H.R.4156 | Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment Appropriations Act | "Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2008, and for other purposes." | Passed House; Failed Senate | 11/07 | Congress debated a proposal that the president begin phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq starting this year[...] If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against a plan to start withdrawing troops this year? | 10/06 |
| H.R.2956 | Responsible Redeployment from Iraq Act | "To require the Secretary of Defense to commence the reduction of the number of United States Armed Forces in Iraq to a limited presence by April 1, 2008, and for other purposes." | Passed House; Died | 07/07 | Congress debated a proposal that the president begin phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq starting this year[...] If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against a plan to start withdrawing troops this year? | 10/06 |
| S.5 | Stem Cell Research Advancement Act | "A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for human embryonic stem cell research." | Passed House & Senate; Vetoed by President | 06/07 | Now we'd like to ask you about whether the federal government should fund stem cell research. Some in Congress argue that this research may lead to cures for diseases and disabilities affecting large numbers of Americans, and should be funded. Others argue that a potential human life has to be destroyed in order to use these cells, and funding it would be unethical. What do you think? If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against federal funds for this research? | 10/06 |
| H.R.3961 | Medicare Physician Payment Reform Act | "To extend expiring provisions of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 until February 28, 2011." | Passed House & Senate; Became law | 11/09 | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Allow U.S. spy agencies to eavesdrop on overseas terrorist suspects without first getting a court order. | 10/08 |
| H.R.12 | Paycheck Fairness Act | "To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide more effective remedies to victims of discrimination in the payment of wages...ensuring that companies receiving federal contracts comply with anti-discrimination affirmative action requirements of Executive Order 11246." | Passed House; Died | 01/09 | Affirmative action programs give preference to racial minorities and to women in employment and college admissions in order to correct for discrimination. Do you support or oppose affirmative action? | 10/08 |

| | | | | | | |
|----------|---|--|-----------------------------------|-------|---|-------|
| H.R.2 | Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act | "To amend title XXI of the Social Security Act to extend and improve the Children's Health Insurance Program, and for other purposes." | Passed House & Senate; Became law | 02/09 | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Fund a \$20 billion program to provide health insurance for children in families earning less than \$43,000. | 10/08 |
| H.R.384 | TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009 | "To reform the Troubled Assets Relief Program of the Secretary of the Treasury and ensure accountability under such Program." | Passed House; Died | 01/09 | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. U.S. Government's \$700 Billion Bank Bailout Plan. | 10/08 |
| H.R.3826 | Electricity Security and Affordability Act | "Prohibits the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from issuing, implementing, or enforcing any proposed or final rule under the Clean Air Act that establishes a performance standard for greenhouse gas emissions from any new source that is a fossil fuel-fired electric utility generating unit unless the rule meets specified requirements of this Act." | Passed House; Died | 03/14 | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Imposes a cap on carbon emissions and allows companies to trade allowances for carbon emissions. Funds research on renewable energy. | 10/10 |
| H.C.R.96 | Ryan Budget Bill | "Establishing the budget for the United States Government for fiscal year 2015 and setting forth appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2016 through 2024." | Passed House; Died | 04/14 | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. 2011 House Budget Plan: The budget plan would cut Medicare and Medicaid by 42%. Would reduce debt by 16% by 2020. | 10/12 |
| H.R.444 | Require a PLAN Act | "To require that, if the President's fiscal year 2014 budget does not achieve balance in a fiscal year covered by such budget, the President shall submit a supplemental unified budget by April 1, 2013, which identifies a fiscal year in which balance is achieved, and for other purposes." | Passed House; Died | 02/13 | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Simpson-Bowles Budget Plan: The plan would make 15% cuts across the board in Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Defense, as well as other programs. Eliminate many tax breaks for individuals and corporations. Would reduce debt by 21% by 2020. | 10/12 |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|------------------------------------|---------|---|--|-------|--|-------|
| H.R.45 | An Act | | "To repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and health care-related provisions in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010." | Passed House; Died | 5/13 | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Repeal the Affordable Care Act. | 10/12 |
| H.R.2048 | USA Act | FREEDOM | "The act imposes some new limits on the bulk collection of telecommunication metadata on U.S. citizens by American intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency." | Passed House & Senate; Became law | 05/15 | Do you support or oppose each of the following policies? NSA Phone Surveillance. Would block funding of the National Security Agency's program that gathers details on every phone call made by or to a U.S. phone unless the records were part of a specific investigation. | 10/14 |
| H.R.3762 | An Act | | "To provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 2002 of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2016." | Passed House & Senate; Vetoed by President | 01/16 | Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress, would you vote FOR or AGAINST the following? Repeal the Affordable Care Act. | 10/14 |
| H.R.36 | Pain-Capable Unborn Protection Act | Child | "Makes it a crime for any person to perform or attempt to perform an abortion if the (...) fetus is 20 weeks or more." | Passed House; Failed Senate | 05/15 | On the issue of abortion, do you support or oppose the following proposal? Prohibit abortions after the 20th week of pregnancy. | 10/14 |
| S.304 | Conscience Protection Act | | "Amends the Public Health Service Act to codify the prohibition against the federal government and state and local governments that receive federal financial assistance for health-related activities penalizing or discriminating against a health care provider based on the provider's refusal to be involved in, or provide coverage for, abortion." | Passed House & Senate; Died | 07/16 | Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Allow employers to decline coverage of abortions in insurance plans. | 10/14 |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------|---|---------|---|--------------------------|-------|--|-------|
| H.R.3134 | Defund Parenthood Act | Planned | "Prohibits, for a one-year period, the availability of federal funds for any purpose to Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., or any of its affiliates or clinics, unless they certify that the affiliates and clinics will not perform, and will not provide any funds to any other entity that performs, an abortion during such period." | Passed House; Died | 9/15 | Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Prohibit the expenditure of funds authorized or appropriated by federal law for any abortion. | 10/14 |
| H.R.4760 | Securing America's Future Act | | "Provides for additional border security personnel." | Failed House | 6/18 | What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Increase border patrols along the U.S.-Mexico border. | 10/16 |
| H.R. 6136 | Border Security and Immigration Reform Act | | "Increases enforcement personnel along the border" | Failed House | 6/18 | What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Increase border patrols along the U.S.-Mexico border. | 10/16 |
| H.R. 38 | Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act | | "Allows a qualified individual to carry a concealed handgun into (...) another state that allows individuals to carry concealed firearms" | Passed House; Died | 12/17 | On the issue of gun regulation, do you support or oppose the following proposal? Make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permits. | 10/16 |
| H.R. 36 | Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act | | "Makes it a crime for any person to perform or attempt to perform an abortion if the (...) fetus is 20 weeks or more." | Passed House; Died | 10/17 | On the issue of abortion, do you support or oppose the following proposal? Prohibit abortions after the 20th week of pregnancy. | 10/16 |
| H.R.7 | No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion and Abortion Insurance Full Disclosure Act | | "Prohibits taxpayer funded abortions." | Passed House; Died | 1/17 | On the issue of abortion, do you support or oppose the following proposal? Prohibit the expenditure of funds authorized or appropriated by federal law for any abortion. | 10/16 |
| H.R.1628a | American Care Act | Health | "Prohibits the small employer tax credit for employee health insurance from being used for health plans that include coverage for abortions." | Passed House; Died | 5/17 | On the issue of abortion, do you support or oppose the following proposal? Allow employers to decline coverage of abortions in insurance plans. | 10/16 |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-------------------|--------|---|--------------------|------|---|-------|
| H.R. 1119 | SENSE Act | | "Eases emission limits for hazardous air pollutants from electric power plants that convert coal refuse into energy." | Passed House; Died | 3/18 | On the issue of the environment, do you support or oppose the following proposal? Require a minimum amount of renewable fuels (wind, solar, and hydroelectric) in the generation of electricity even if electricity prices increase somewhat. | 10/16 |
| H.R.1628 | American Care Act | Health | "To repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act." | Passed House; Died | 5/17 | Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress, would you vote FOR or AGAINST the following? Repeal the Affordable Care Act. | 10/16 |
| H.R.1628b | American Care Act | Health | "This bill amends the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 to increase funding for community health centers." | Passed House; Died | 5/17 | Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress, would you vote FOR or AGAINST the following? Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act. | 10/16 |

In this analysis, the independent variables (public opinion estimates across demographic categories) are estimated with uncertainty. To account for this source of uncertainty, in addition to that which pertains to the logistic regression outcome models, I use the method known as propagated uncertainty or the method of composition (Tanner, 1996; Treier and Jackman, 2008), which is one of the best practices for representing uncertainty in the responsiveness via multi-level regression and poststratification (MRP) literature (e.g., Lax et al., 2019).⁵

5.1 Responsiveness by Race and Party

In this section I begin by considering those 25 opinion-vote dyads that meet the temporal criterion. Table 2 presents the results of a logistic regression of roll call votes on all bills taken together on White, Black, and Latino support for corresponding policy issues. Columns 1-3 present the results for all legislators. The logit coefficients on the first row are not easily interpretable, but they suggest that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between each group's opinion taken separately and the probability of a "yea" roll call vote. Furthermore, the logit coefficient relating preference to roll call votes is smallest for Blacks (0.16), followed by Latinos (0.39) and Whites (0.63).

I gauge the magnitude of the preference-vote link by comparing the predicted probability of adoption for highly popular versus highly unpopular bills (Gilens, 2012). The fourth row of the table shows the predicted probability of a "yea" vote occurring if 20 percent of respondents favor the bill, and the fifth row shows the predicted probability of a "yea" vote occurring if 80 percent of

⁵The weighting of the sample (CCES) estimates by the population (Census) frequencies proceeds by taking draws from the posterior distribution of the linear predictor of opinion estimates. Each draw yields a single predicted probability for each demographic category in each congressional district. I "propagate" uncertainty from this stage to the outcome modeling stage by fitting a logistic regression of roll call votes on opinion estimates from each individual draw in the opinion estimation stage. Each individual regression yields an estimated coefficient vector and variance-covariance matrix. The final step for each individual draw then consists of draws from a multivariate normal distribution with mean and variance-covariance parameters set to the corresponding estimates from the regression of roll call votes on the opinion estimates. Repeating this procedure many times (500 draws) generates 500 draws from the posterior distribution of the coefficient vector for the regression of roll call votes on opinion estimates. Point and interval estimates (and other relevant quantities) are then simply functions of this posterior distribution, e.g., the point estimate is the mean of the posterior distribution and the 95% interval estimate is the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of the posterior distribution. For more on this procedure, see Treier and Jackman (2008), specifically pages 214 – 216, as well as Tanner (1996), specifically section 3.3.2.

Table 2: Responsiveness by Constituent Race (All Congresses, All Issues)

| | All Representatives | | | Democratic Representatives | | | Republican Representatives | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------|--------------|---------------|----------------------------|--------------|---------------|----------------------------|--------------|---------------|
| | White (1) | Black (2) | Latino (3) | White (4) | Black (5) | Latino (6) | White (7) | Black (8) | Latino (9) |
| Logistic coefficient | 0.628** | 0.156** | 0.391** | 0.386** | 1.264** | 0.758** | 0.764** | -1.103** | -0.061** |
| (Standard error) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.005) | 0.007 | 0.008 |
| Intercept | 0.243 | 0.264 | 0.231 | -0.478 | -0.667 | -0.565 | 0.987 | 1.256 | 1.043 |
| Pred. prob. if 20% favor | 0.348 | 0.512 | 0.423 | 0.267 | 0.082 | 0.166 | 0.482 | 0.942 | 0.755 |
| Pred. prob. if 80% favor | 0.753 | 0.618 | 0.684 | 0.515 | 0.747 | 0.619 | 0.886 | 0.432 | 0.723 |
| Diff. in predicted probs. | 2.163 | 1.207 | 1.619 | 1.928 | 9.150 | 3.732 | 1.838 | 0.459 | 0.957 |
| N | 10,208 | 10,208 | 10,208 | 4,937 | 4,937 | 4,937 | 5,271 | 5,271 | 5,271 |

respondents favor the bill. The sixth row shows the ratio of row 5 to row 4. This ratio represents how much the probability of a "yea" vote increases as constituency support increases from weak to strong support of the bill. These findings suggest that Black respondents' views are the least strongly related to legislators' votes. The predicted probability of a legislator voting favorably on a bill increases from 0.51 when 20 percent of Black constituents favor the bill, to 0.62 when 80 percent of Black constituents favor the bill. The ratio of these two probabilities is 1.21, meaning that a bill that is highly popular among Blacks is not much more likely to be approved than an unpopular bill. This increase in probability of approval is larger for Latinos (1.62) and Whites (2.16).

Columns 4-6 and 7-9 present similar results for Democratic and Republican representatives, respectively. Democratic representatives seem to be most responsive to Black constituents, followed by Latinos and Whites. Republican representatives, on the other hand, seem to be most responsive to White constituents. The relationship between Black and Latino opinion and Republican representatives' roll call votes is negative and statistically significant. This may very well be true. The Democratic Party is more racially diverse than ever before; a plurality (40 percent) of its members are Black, Hispanic, or Asian American ([Oliphant, 2019](#)). Democratic legislators therefore have an electoral incentive to appeal to the preferences of minority voters. The Republican Party, on the other hand, is overwhelmingly made up of non-Hispanic Whites (83%), rendering legislative over-responsiveness to this group unsurprising. Republican legislators do not have strong electoral incentives to respond to the preferences of ethnoracial minorities. This suggests that, what may initially look like racial bias in responsiveness (columns 1-3), is actually partisan bias. It could

also be, however, that this approach fails to disentangle opinion by partisanship as well as race, which could yield misleading results.

In order to better explore partisan disparities in responsiveness to minority constituents, I repeat the analysis focusing instead on the opinion of representatives' copartisans. This approach allows me to gauge potential racial disparities in representation without crossing party lines. Table 3 shows the results of a series of logistic regressions of House votes on the opinions of White, Black, and Latino constituents *within* each party. Columns 1-3 present the results for Democrats. The coefficients on the first row suggest that the opinion-vote link is positive and statistically significant for all groups, but larger for Blacks, followed by Latinos and Whites. Turning again to the relative difference in predicted probabilities (approval of highly popular versus highly unpopular bills), the ratios on the final row similarly suggest that Democratic representatives are most responsive to both minority groups compared with their White counterparts. Republicans, on the other hand, are least responsive to Black copartisans compared with Latinos and Whites (columns 4-6). In the Democratic case, the preferences of Blacks and Latinos are likely very similar, as is the case of Whites and Latinos in the Republican Party.

Table 3: Responsiveness by Constituent Race and Party (All Congresses, All Issues)

| | Democratic Representatives | | | Republican Representatives | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | White Dem (1) | Black Dem (2) | Latino Dem (3) | White GOP (4) | Black GOP (5) | Latino GOP (6) |
| Logistic coefficient | 1.010** | 1.125** | 1.108** | 1.261** | 0.620** | 0.658** |
| (Standard error) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Intercept | -0.462 | -0.686 | -0.655 | 0.799 | 0.620 | 0.658 |
| Pred. prob. if 20% favor | 0.134 | 0.096 | 0.101 | 0.279 | 0.299 | 0.246 |
| Pred. prob. if 80% favor | 0.719 | 0.705 | 0.707 | 0.927 | 0.890 | 0.920 |
| Diff. in predicted probs. | 5.349 | 7.367 | 7.030 | 3.320 | 2.979 | 3.743 |
| N | 4,937 | 4,937 | 4,937 | 5,271 | 5,271 | 5,271 |

These results do not consider the role of income, or the simultaneous roles of copartisan, racial-group and income-group opinion in explaining House votes. This is the focus of the next two sections.

5.2 Responsiveness by Race and Income

The analyses presented in this section are analogous to those in Section 5.1 (particularly in Table 3) but considering the role of income as opposed to party. Table 4 presents the results of a series of bivariate logistic regressions of House votes on all bills taken together on the opinions of White, Black, and Latino constituents *within* each income group. Panel (A) presents the results for all legislators. The coefficients on the first row suggest that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the opinion of each racial-income group and representatives' votes. Looking within racial group, the coefficients on the high-income category (0.61 for Whites, 0.27 for Blacks, and 0.40 for Latinos) are always larger than those of the low-income category (0.40 for Whites, 0.14 for Blacks, and 0.27 for Latinos). Looking instead within the high-income group, the coefficient on White opinion is larger than Latino opinion and Black opinion (in that order). The ratios of predicted probability for bills with low versus high approval indicate that bills supported by 80 percent of high-income White constituents are a little over twice as likely to be approved (2.11) than bills supported by only 20 percent of the same group. This ratio is largest for high-income Whites, high-income Latinos (1.64), and low-income Whites (1.62) and lowest for low-income Blacks (1.19).

Panels (B) and (C) repeat the analyses on subsets of legislators: Democrats and Republicans, respectively. Both the coefficients along the first row and the ratios along the sixth row of panel (B) suggest that Democratic legislators are more responsive to low-income Whites than to high-income Whites, less responsive to low-income Blacks than to high-income Blacks, and less responsive to low-income Latinos than to high-income Latinos. It seems that income plays a different role in the relationship between White opinion and Democrats' House votes when compared to minority opinion. Consistent with the findings in Table 3, Democrats are more responsive to Black constituents, followed by Latinos and Whites. This table adds the caveat of income: Democratic legislators do not respond equally to high- and low-income Blacks. A bill has a higher probability of being approved when 80 percent of high-income Blacks support it compared to when 80 percent of low-income Blacks support it. The differences between income group ratios are smaller for Latino and

Table 4: Responsiveness by Constituent Race and Income (All Congresses, All Issues)

| (A) All legislators | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|
| | White-Low | White-High | Black-Low | Black-High | Latino-Low | Latino-High |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Logistic coefficient | 0.396** | 0.611** | 0.142** | 0.267** | 0.268** | 0.401** |
| (Standard error) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
| Intercept | 0.252 | 0.257 | 0.259 | 0.266 | 0.240 | 0.220 |
| Pred. prob. if 20% favor | 0.426 | 0.357 | 0.516 | 0.474 | 0.467 | 0.417 |
| Pred. prob. if 80% favor | 0.690 | 0.751 | 0.612 | 0.654 | 0.648 | 0.685 |
| Diff. in predicted probs. | 1.618 | 2.106 | 1.187 | 1.380 | 1.387 | 1.642 |
| N | 10,208 | 10,208 | 10,208 | 10,208 | 10,208 | 10,208 |

| (B) Democratic Legislators | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|
| | White-Low | White-High | Black-Low | Black-High | Latino-Low | Latino-High |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Logistic coefficient | 0.554** | 0.224** | 1.075** | 1.379** | 0.674** | 0.703** |
| (Standard error) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.011) | (0.007) | (0.009) |
| Intercept | -0.498 | -0.472 | -0.655 | -0.666 | -0.578 | -0.565 |
| Pred. prob. if 20% favor | 0.220 | 0.314 | 0.105 | 0.071 | 0.181 | 0.177 |
| Pred. prob. if 80% favor | 0.567 | 0.460 | 0.698 | 0.777 | 0.588 | 0.601 |
| Diff. in predicted probs. | 2.578 | 1.464 | 6.592 | 11.007 | 3.259 | 3.402 |
| N | 4,937 | 4,937 | 4,937 | 4,937 | 4,937 | 4,937 |

| (C) Republican Legislators | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|
| | White-Low | White-High | Black-Low | Black-High | Latino-Low | Latino-High |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Logistic coefficient | 0.119** | 0.987** | -0.888** | -1.076** | -0.197** | -0.020 |
| (Standard error) | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.012) | (0.007) | (0.010) |
| Intercept | 1.023 | 1.012 | 1.241 | 1.263 | 1.066 | 1.035 |
| Pred. prob. if 20% favor | 0.702 | 0.412 | 0.922 | 0.940 | 0.792 | 0.743 |
| Pred. prob. if 80% favor | 0.766 | 0.915 | 0.503 | 0.443 | 0.689 | 0.732 |
| Diff. in predicted probs. | 1.091 | 2.222 | 0.545 | 0.471 | 0.869 | 0.985 |
| N | 5,271 | 5,271 | 5,271 | 5,271 | 5,271 | 5,271 |

White opinion.

Contrary to Democratic representatives, Republican representatives are *least* responsive to minority constituents. The coefficients on Black and Latino opinion, regardless of income category, are all negative and most are statistically significant (with the exception of high-income Latinos). Conversely, the coefficients on the opinions of low- and high-income Whites are both positive and statistically significant. The ratios on the sixth row suggest that, when high-income Whites exhibit strong support for a bill, Republican representatives are a little over twice as likely to pass the bill, compared to a scenario in which only 20 percent of high-income Whites supported the bill. The

ratio is smaller for low-income Whites.

5.3 Responsiveness by Race, Party, and Income

While the previous section examined how representatives of different parties respond to the preferences of constituents of different racial-income groups, it did not include constituents' partisanship in the analysis. In this section, I explore how Democratic and Republican representatives respond to the preferences of *copartisan* constituents of different racial-income groups. Table 5 shows that the results for Democrats are similar to those in Table 4. Democratic representatives are most responsive to Black constituents (regardless of income status) than to Latinos and Whites. One important difference is that, focusing only on their copartisan constituents, the coefficient on the high-income category is always higher than the low-income category across the three racial groups. Furthermore, the differences between income group ratios within the White and Latino categories are larger than those in Table 4. Overall, Democratic representatives are most responsive to Black copartisans (regardless of income), followed by high-income Latinos, low-income Latinos and high-income Whites, and finally low-income Whites.

Unlike Democrats, the case for Republican representatives is different when constituents' partisanship is taken into account. Table 4 showed negative coefficients on minority opinion across income groups. By contrast, Table 5 shows positive and statistically significant coefficients for all racial-income groups. Among their copartisans, Republican representatives are similarly responsive to constituents of the three racial groups in the high-income category. They are least responsive to low-income Blacks. Blacks in general make up a very small proportion of the Republican Party, so Republican representatives lack electoral incentives to respond to the preferences of this group.

Table 5: Responsiveness by Constituent Race, Party and Income (All Congresses, All Issues)

| (A) Democratic Legislators | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| | White-Dem-Low | White-Dem-High | Black-Dem-Low | Black-Dem-High | Latino-Dem-Low | Latino-Dem-High |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Logistic coefficient | 0.952** | 1.027** | 1.021** | 1.196** | 0.999** | 1.167** |
| (Standard error) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.006) |
| Intercept | -0.489 | -0.429 | -0.675 | -0.684 | -0.646 | -0.644 |
| Pred. prob. if 20% favor | 0.141 | 0.136 | 0.110 | 0.088 | 0.116 | 0.094 |
| Pred. prob. if 80% favor | 0.697 | 0.730 | 0.677 | 0.726 | 0.677 | 0.726 |
| Diff. in predicted probs. | 4.947 | 5.382 | 6.156 | 8.271 | 5.839 | 7.688 |
| N | 4,937 | 4,937 | 4,937 | 4,937 | 4,937 | 4,937 |

| (B) Republican Legislators | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| | White-GOP-Low | White-GOP-High | Black-GOP-Low | Black-GOP-High | Latino-GOP-Low | Latino-GOP-High |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Logistic coefficient | 1.171** | 1.284** | 0.877** | 1.158** | 1.153** | 1.322** |
| (Standard error) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.008) | (0.012) | (0.008) | (0.009) |
| Intercept | 0.815 | 0.793 | 0.659 | 0.634 | 0.672 | 0.656 |
| Pred. prob. if 20% favor | 0.308 | 0.271 | 0.364 | 0.275 | 0.283 | 0.236 |
| Pred. prob. if 80% favor | 0.920 | 0.929 | 0.867 | 0.904 | 0.906 | 0.923 |
| Diff. in predicted probs. | 2.984 | 3.423 | 2.381 | 3.290 | 3.198 | 3.929 |
| N | 5,271 | 5,271 | 5,271 | 5,271 | 5,271 | 5,271 |

Overall, the analyses presented in this section only show part of the picture. It is possible that pooling all policy issues together obscures important distinctions in the preferences of different groups. These results also highlight an important concern: Black and Latino individuals may receive coincidental representation even if legislators respond more to their White constituents, as long as the preferences of minorities align with those of Whites. (Enns, 2015). This may be especially true for Latinos who, as we saw in Section 4, tend to agree with Whites on many policy issues. It is therefore imperative to make distinctions between policy types. In the next section I restrict the multivariate analysis to those opinion-vote pairs on which the preferences of Whites, Blacks, and Latinos differ by 10 percent or more at the congressional district level (Gilens, 2012). I consider each issue area separately.

5.4 Issue-Specific Responsiveness by Race, Party, and Income

When Whites and minorities disagree on policy issues, whose preferences are members of Congress more responsive to? Does the size of the group matter? Is the policy type what drives responsiveness to minorities? Or are the opinions of copartisans or high-income constituents the most important in representatives' decision-making process? Answering these questions has been difficult in the past due to a lack of reliable measures of congressional district-level opinion on specific policy issues, broken down by racial, partisan, and income group. The analyses presented here do just that. The coefficient plots in Figures 2 and 3 show the results of a series of multivariate logistic regressions of House votes on specific bills on Black or Latino opinion (using White as the base category), respectively. The regression models also include middle-income and high-income opinion (using low-income as the base category), copartisan opinion, and majority-minority district status⁶ as independent variables. Both the independent and dependent variables are measured on the same scale. The issues included in this part of the analysis are those on which there are substantial, district-level racial differences in opinion (10 percent or more).


⁶Measured as 1 if 50% or more of the congressional district's population is comprised of ethnoracial minorities, and 0 otherwise

White and Black Americans hold different opinions on a range of topics. Some of the largest disparities in the dataset include (1) federal spending on abortion clinics, (2) affirmative action, (3) withdrawing troops from Iraq, (4) repealing the Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare"), and (5) funding the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Figure 2 is chronologically divided into two panels for ease of visual interpretation. The coefficients show that, using White opinion as the base category, Black opinion on repealing the Affordable Care Act (2014), withdrawing troops from Iraq, funding CHIP, affirmative action, border patrols, and insurance coverage of abortions is negatively associated with House members' votes on those bills. These logit coefficients are statistically significant, some more strongly than others. These results suggest that as Black support for those policies increases, the probability that a member of Congress will vote favorably on the corresponding bill decreases. This relationship holds even after controlling for majority-minority district status (i.e., even in districts in which Whites are not in the numerical majority), copartisan opinion, and middle- and high-income opinion.

The sizes of the logit coefficients are not easily interpretable from this plot. The marginal effects shown in Table 6 show that the change in the probability of representatives' voting yes on these bills as a function of Black opinion is quite small. The largest coefficient is -0.05 for border patrols: as the proportion of Black constituents who support border patrols increases, the probability that representatives will vote favorably on that bill decreases by 5 percentage points—holding copartisan constituent support, middle- and high-income constituent support, and majority-minority district status fixed. The one exception to the consistently negative coefficients on Black opinion is the "Spy Terrorists" bill. The higher the proportion of Blacks who support allowing U.S. spy agencies to eavesdrop on overseas terrorist suspects, the higher the probability that representatives will vote yes on that bill. It is likely that other factors (not accounted for here) influence legislators' votes on this type of foreign policy bill.

Holding low-income opinions as the base category, the logistic regressions also show that the attitudes of middle-income constituents regarding repealing Obamacare (2014 and 2016), withdrawing troops from Iraq, funding CHIP, and affirmative action are positively related with legislators'

Figure 2: Logistic Regressions of House Votes on Racial, Partisan, and Income Group Opinion Measures, White-Black Differences Only



roll call votes on those bills. The coefficient on middle-income constituents' opinion on spying on overseas terrorists subjects is negative. These estimates are all statistically significant. The same is true for the opinion of high-income constituents, with the added bills of increasing border patrols, funding abortion clinics, and insurance coverage of abortions—the estimates of which were statistically indistinguishable from zero for middle-income constituents and negative for Black constituents. In other words, as support for these bills increases with income strata, so does the probability that members of the House will vote to pass those bills. The marginal effects in Table 6 are larger for the income groups than for race. In the case of border patrols, for example, the coefficient on high-income opinion is 0.14 (compared to -0.05 for Black opinion). As the proportion

of high-income constituents who support border patrols increases, the probability that representatives will vote favorably on that bill increases by almost 14 percentage points—holding copartisan, Black, and middle-income constituent support, as well as majority-minority district status, fixed. In the case of funding CHIP and withdrawing troops from Iraq, the marginal effects of middle-income opinion (compared with low-income opinion) are larger than those of high-income opinion (compared with low-income opinion).

Table 6: Marginal Effects, White-Black Differences

| | Black | Copartisan | Middle Income | High Income | Majority-Minority |
|---------------------------|--------|------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------|
| Iraq Withdrawal (2006) | -0.023 | 0.088 | 0.084 | 0.044 | 0.035 |
| Affirmative Action (2008) | -0.011 | 0.078 | 0.020 | 0.044 | 0.026 |
| Spy Terrorists (2008) | 0.026 | -0.082 | -0.025 | -0.028 | 0.040 |
| CHIP (2008) | -0.013 | 0.134 | 0.141 | 0.065 | 0.117 |
| Repeal Obamacare (2012) | -0.001 | 0.033 | 0.015 | 0.004 | -0.011 |
| Repeal Obamacare (2014) | -0.010 | 0.047 | 0.023 | 0.017 | -0.008 |
| Repeal Obamacare (2016) | -0.010 | 0.086 | 0.075 | 0.065 | -0.069 |
| Abortion-Insurance (2014) | -0.027 | 0.061 | 0.002 | 0.032 | -0.030 |
| NSA-Phones (2014) | -0.105 | -0.218 | 0.095 | 0.118 | -0.071 |
| Border Patrols (2016) | -0.049 | 0.234 | 0.007 | 0.136 | -0.147 |
| Abortion-Funds (2016) | -0.018 | 0.068 | 0.019 | 0.034 | -0.028 |

The relationship between copartisan opinion and legislators’ voting behavior is positive, strong, and statistically significant for most bills, with the exception of spying on overseas terrorists (negative and statistically significant) and blocking funding of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) program that gathers details on every phone call made by or to a U.S. phone (not statistically significant). The marginal effects in Table 6 vary in size depending on the bill. Among those coefficients that are statistically significant, the largest marginal effects are for the border patrols and Iraq troop withdrawal bills. In those cases, copartisan opinion seems to be a stronger predictor of representatives’ voting behavior than income- and race-based opinion.

Overall, then, the coefficients on copartisan and middle- and high-income constituents’ opinion tend to be positive, while those on Black opinion tend to be negative. The marginal effects of Black opinion are smaller across the board than the marginal effects of copartisan and higher-income constituents’ opinion. In sum, the coefficients on Black opinion are substantively small yet statistically significant, even after accounting for such strong predictors of legislative behavior as are partisanship and income. This suggests that some racial disparities in responsiveness may

remain in certain policy cases.

In contrast to White and Black Americans, Whites and Latinos have similar policy preferences on more issues than not. Among the issues in the dataset, Whites and Latinos hold different opinions on (1) CHIP and (2) affirmative action, as well as on (3) immigration. The results on Figure 3 show that, using White opinion as the base category, there is a positive relationship between Latino support for CHIP and affirmative action and representatives' votes on those bills. As Latino support for the Children's Health Insurance Program and affirmative action increases, the probability of a "yea" vote on those bills also increases. These estimates are statistically significant, even after controlling for majority-minority district status, copartisan opinion, and middle- and high-income opinion. These estimates, however, are substantively small, especially for affirmative action and immigration (see marginal effects in Table 7). The estimate for Latino opinion on immigration, particularly on the issue of increasing patrols along the U.S.-Mexico border, is statistically insignificant.

The case of the border patrol bill is particularly illuminating because immigration is one of the few race-conscious social policies in the dataset. Immigration might be considered a race-conscious issue in that it has a direct impact on the lives of minorities. This particular policy, Securing America's Future Act, called for an increase of border patrols along the U.S.-Mexico border and thus disproportionately affected Latinos (either directly or indirectly through non-native family members and acquaintances). Although immigration is an important partisan cleavage, racial differences exist within the parties. There is a 12-percent difference in the Democratic Party and an 11-percent difference in the Republican Party between Whites' and Latinos' opinion on H.R.4760. Since this policy targets racial minorities, and it is presumably one they value more than Whites, we would expect representatives to be especially responsive to the preferences of Black and Latino constituents. An alternative interpretation is that immigration policy is an increasingly contentious topic in American politics, and as Whites become more strongly opposed to it, representatives will become more likely to support punitive immigration bills. Whites' opposition might trump Latinos' support in this particular case.

Figure 3: Logistic Regressions of House Votes on Racial, Partisan, and Income Group Opinion Measures, White-Latino Differences Only




Table 7: Marginal Effects, White-Latino Differences

| | Latino | Copartisan | Middle Income | High Income | Majority-Minority |
|---------------------------|--------|------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------|
| Affirmative Action (2008) | 0.016 | 0.079 | 0.013 | 0.040 | 0.022 |
| CHIP (2008) | 0.046 | 0.133 | 0.128 | 0.052 | 0.116 |
| Border Patrols (2016) | 0.012 | 0.234 | -0.003 | 0.122 | -0.154 |

When focusing on issues with large White-Latino opinion differences, the strongest predictors of legislators' votes also seem to be the preferences of copartisans and high-income constituents. In both cases the estimates are positive and statistically significant. The marginal effects of copartisan and high-income constituents' opinion are also substantively larger than those of Latino opinion. For example, on the immigration bill, as the proportion of copartisans who support the bill increases, the probability that representatives will vote yes on the bill increases by 23.4 percentage

points, holding Latino, middle-income, and high-income opinion fixed, as well as majority-minority district status.

It is also worth noting that, in both cases (White-Black differences and White-Latino differences), Blacks and Latinos are more supportive than Whites of policies that require federal spending on social services, be it health insurance for poor children (CHIP), universal health care (the ACA), or abortion clinics. It is interesting that, in the case of CHIP and affirmative action, the coefficients on Latino and Black opinion have opposite signs. This suggests that scholars and political commentators alike should exercise caution when grouping Black and Latino constituents under the minority umbrella. The coefficients on the majority-minority variable are positive and statistically significant for CHIP, affirmative action, and withdrawing troops from Iraq, suggesting that districts with majority Black and Latino populations are more likely to pass these bills. Conversely, the majority-minority district coefficients are negative and statistically significant for repealing Obamacare, prohibiting the use of public funding for abortion clinics, prohibiting insurance coverage of abortions, and increasing border patrols.

The negative relationship between Black opinion and representatives' voting behavior and the positive relationship between Latino opinion and representatives' voting behavior, even after accounting for class- and party-based distortions in representation, is the most striking finding in this analysis, with the caveat that the estimates are substantively small. Another important finding is that the coefficients on Black and Latino opinion go in opposing directions. Finally, the coefficients on the copartisan and high-income variables are always positive and statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the responsiveness literature. As the support of copartisan and high-income constituents for a bill increases, House members are more likely to vote in favor of that bill. This is true for policies over which Whites and Blacks disagree, as well as policies over which Whites and Latinos disagree.

6 Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper I used CCES data and MRP to develop estimates of congressional district-level public opinion by racial, partisan, and income subgroup on bills spanning over ten issue areas and ten years. The descriptive portion of the study shows that substantial racial differences in opinion persist after accounting for partisanship and income. White and Black Democrats, for example, disagree on the topic of affirmative action. Similarly, White and Latino Democrats disagree on the issue of immigration. There are many policy issues, however, on which opinion cuts across partisan lines and not racial lines (e.g., some abortion policies). This paper highlights the importance of exploring the interplay of distinct identities in public opinion. Another important contribution of this paper is the emphasis on issue-specific responsiveness. Grouping opinion and votes on an array of policy issues masks significant distinctions between policy types. Examining each issue area separately allows us to make inferences about legislative responsiveness to race-targeted social policies.

I find that, when grouping all policy issues and legislators together, White opinion is the most strongly associated with legislators' votes, followed by Latino opinion and lastly Black opinion. When examining the relative influence of White, Black, and Latino opinion *within* each party, I find that Democratic legislators are more responsive to minority groups' demands and Republican legislators are more responsive to Whites' demands. On those issues in which the preferences of Whites and Blacks diverge, such as on affirmative action, Black opinion seems to be either insignificant or negatively related to the probability of legislators voting yes on the same bill. Conversely, on those issues in which the preferences of Whites and Latinos diverge, Latino opinion seems to be either insignificant or positively related to legislators' roll call votes. The opinions of copartisan and high-income constituents drive legislative voting behavior on all issues considered here. However, even after accounting for some of the strongest predictors of legislative voting behavior (class and party), some racial disparities—albeit small—remain. In other words, observed racial disparities in responsiveness are partially, but not entirely, explained by income and partisanship. The analyses presented here are consistent with recent studies and highlight the important role of

partisanship and class in shaping government responsiveness.

Taken together, these results challenge the proportional view of political equality. Racial minorities are not necessarily better represented, when compared with Whites, in jurisdictions where the former comprise a majority of the population—i.e., in majority-minority districts. These findings do not provide evidence in favor of the race-conscious egalitarian view of equality; it is not the case that Blacks, who have been historically and systematically disadvantaged in American society and politics, are equally represented even in jurisdictions where they make up the numerical minority. The evidence does not meet the pluralist standard of equality either; minorities are not strongly represented on policy issues of unique importance to them (e.g., Latinos on immigration).

Continued research will examine congruence in addition to responsiveness, and will consider a larger set of policy issues by using additional data sources. While the issues considered here cover a broad range of policy domains, only a handful of them are considered race-conscious or race-targeted. In addition, I plan to extend the analysis beyond the House to also include Senators' voting behavior. Finally, incorporating spatial models into the MRP procedure has the potential to improve the precision of the public opinion estimates.

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A MRP Step by Step

1. **Data** → Identify, download, and "clean" the relevant data:

- Poll data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), years 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 (N = 50,000+ for each year) → The CCES includes measures of individual-level opinion on a range of policy issues, as well as individuals' partisanship, congressional district, and demographic information.
- Demographic and geographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS), years 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 → Consists of cross-tabulations of the number of individuals in each Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) by race, gender, education, income and age. A PUMA is the smallest administrative unit at which these data are available. These data do not exist at the congressional-district level.
 - Conversion data from the University of Missouri Census Data Center → Contains equivalences, or conversion rates, between PUMAs and congressional districts. These data indicate what proportion of each congressional district is contained within each PUMA.
- District-level variables from the Census → These data include the total population, median income, the percentage of people in the district who speak a language other than English at home, the number of veterans in the district, and the percentage of people in each district in same-sex couples.

2. **Partisanship** → Since the Census does not contain partisan identification data, it is not possible to include party ID in the ACS cross-tabs directly. One solution is to apply standard MRP to the three-point party ID item in the CCES.

There are three categories for the party identification outcome: Democrat, Independent, and Republican. With this trinomial outcome, I estimate a nested multinomial logit model (Kastellec et al., 2015, 792). More specifically, I use multilevel generalized logistic regression models to predict individuals' party identification given the baseline factors that I will use for subsequent poststratification. I estimate these nested logistic models with the [R] package `rstanarm`. The nested multilevel logistic models, which permit the intercept term to vary by congressional district, are:

(1)

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Pr(Y_j = \text{Dem}) &= \text{logit}^{-1} \left(\alpha^0 + \beta_{r[j]}^{\text{race}} + \beta_{a[j]}^{\text{age}} + \beta_{e[j]}^{\text{edu}} + \beta_{g[j]}^{\text{gender}} + \beta_{i[j]}^{\text{income}} + \beta_{d[j]}^{\text{district}} \right) \\
 \Pr(Y_j = \text{Ind} \mid Y_j = \text{Non-Dem}) &= \text{logit}^{-1} \left(\alpha^0 + \beta_{r[j]}^{\text{race}} + \beta_{a[j]}^{\text{age}} + \beta_{e[j]}^{\text{edu}} + \beta_{g[j]}^{\text{gender}} + \beta_{i[j]}^{\text{income}} + \beta_{d[j]}^{\text{district}} \right) \\
 \Pr(Y_j = \text{GOP}) &= \text{logit}^{-1} \left(\alpha^0 + \beta_{r[j]}^{\text{race}} + \beta_{a[j]}^{\text{age}} + \beta_{e[j]}^{\text{edu}} + \beta_{g[j]}^{\text{gender}} + \beta_{i[j]}^{\text{income}} + \beta_{d[j]}^{\text{district}} \right) \\
 \Pr(Y_j = \text{Ind} \mid Y_j = \text{Non-GOP}) &= \text{logit}^{-1} \left(\alpha^0 + \beta_{r[j]}^{\text{race}} + \beta_{a[j]}^{\text{age}} + \beta_{e[j]}^{\text{edu}} + \beta_{g[j]}^{\text{gender}} + \beta_{i[j]}^{\text{income}} + \beta_{d[j]}^{\text{district}} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

where the index $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ runs over the n individual respondents of the CCES. Each party outcome could also include a year indicator, but since I fit a model for each year separately, I omit the year subscript to make the notation clearer. The indexes r , a , e , g , i and d run over the race, age, education, gender, income and congressional district categories, respectively. The second level of the hierarchical model for the parameters in (1) above is:

$$\begin{aligned}
(2) \quad & \beta_r^{\text{race}} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \sigma_{\text{race}}^2\right) \text{ for } r \in \{1, 2, 3\} \\
& \beta_a^{\text{age}} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \sigma_{\text{age}}^2\right) \text{ for } a \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \\
& \beta_e^{\text{edu}} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \sigma_{\text{edu}}^2\right) \text{ for } e \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\} \\
& \beta_g^{\text{gender}} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \sigma_{\text{gender}}^2\right) \text{ for } g \in \{0, 1\} \\
& \beta_i^{\text{income}} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \sigma_{\text{income}}^2\right) \text{ for } i \in \{1, 2, 3\} \\
& \beta_d^{\text{district}} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\alpha_{0[d]}, \sigma_{\text{district}}^2\right) \text{ for } d \in \{1, \dots, 435\},
\end{aligned}$$

where $\alpha_{0[d]}$ represents the district-specific intercept. In short, each individual level coefficient in (1) is modeled as drawn from a Normal distribution with mean (μ) equal to 0 and a variance parameter (σ^2) that is to be estimated from survey data.

From the models in (1), I generate the respective posterior distributions of the linear predicted probabilities of respondents' party identifications given each demographic-geographic category. More specifically, I calculate the linear predicted probability for whether a respondent is Democratic or Non-Democratic and then for whether a respondent is Independent or Republican given that a respondent is Non-Democratic. The predicted probability of being Independent is the product of the probability of being Non-Democratic and the probability of being Independent given that one is Non-Democratic. One can analogously calculate the same predicted probability of being Republican. I also generate the same predicted probabilities for each party identification, but by first predicting whether or not respondents are Republicans and then the conditional probabilities for whether respondents are Independent or Democratic given that they are Non-Republican. I then take the average of the predicted probabilities for each party when the model predicts Democrats versus Non-Democrats and when the model predicts Republicans versus Non-Republicans. For example, the linear predicted probability that an individual is Democratic can be derived from Equation (1) above — namely, $\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \Pr(Y_j = \text{Dem}) + \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \left(1 - \Pr(Y_j = \text{GOP})\right) \left(1 - \Pr(Y_j = \text{Ind} \mid Y_j = \text{Non-GOP})\right)$.

Having generated these predictions of party identification for each demographic-geographic category, I then weight the number of people in each respective category by the predicted proportions of each party. The number of people in each demographic-geographic category is supplied by the Census data. For example, as stated in the main text, the Census data provides the frequency of White males, aged 18 – 29 with annual income less than \$30,000 and educated up to the high school level in the district *AK0*, which is 112. The predicted proportions of Democrats, Independents and Republicans based on the fit of the model in Equation (1) is approximately 0.3417, 0.339 and 0.3193, respectively. Hence, the estimated proportion of Democratic, White males, aged 18 – 29, with annual income less than \$30,000 and high-school educated in the district *AK0* is approximately 38.2703. One can analogously

estimate the same frequencies for Independents and Republicans, which are approximately 37.966 and 35.7637.

3. **Multilevel Regression** → Using data from the CCES, I estimate individual opinion on each bill as a function of a respondent’s race, age, education, gender, income and partisanship, the coefficients of which are permitted to vary by district, as well as district-level variables that are plausibly correlated with public opinion. These include the district’s median income, the percentage of people in the district who speak a language other than English at home, the number of veterans in the district, and the percentage of people in each district in same-sex couples. The model includes a district level and each district has a separate intercept as well as a varying slope for the core explanatory variables of race, age, education, gender, income and partisanship, which is equivalent to interaction terms between district-level indicators and individual-level predictors (see [Gelman and Hill, 2006](#), chapter 13). The model of an individual’s response to a specific survey item, Y_j , can be formally represented as follows:

$$(3) \quad \Pr(Y_j = 1) = \text{logit}^{-1} \left(\alpha^0 + \beta_{r,d[j]}^{\text{race}} + \beta_{a,d[j]}^{\text{age}} + \beta_{e,d[j]}^{\text{edu}} + \beta_{g,d[j]}^{\text{gender}} + \beta_{i,d[j]}^{\text{income}} + \beta_{p,d[j]}^{\text{party}} + \beta_{d[j]}^{\text{district}} \right),$$

where, as in Equation (1) above, the index $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ runs over the n individual respondents in the CCES and $d \in \{1, \dots, 435\}$ runs over the 435 congressional districts. The indexes r, a, e, g, i, p and d run over the race, age, education, gender, income, party and congressional district categories, respectively. As before, the individual outcome could also include a year indicator, but since I fit a model for each year separately, I omit the year subscript for ease of interpretation. In this model, each district coefficient is modeled as a linear function of district-level predictors — namely, total population, median income, percentage of unmarried same-sex households, percentage of people who do not speak English at home and the total number of veterans. This level of the hierarchical model is the same as in Equation (1) above, but with a vector, \mathbf{x}_d , of the aforementioned district-level predictors and a vector of coefficients, $\boldsymbol{\lambda}$, for each respective district-level predictor. Formally, we can write the additional level of the model in Equation (3) as follows:

$$(4) \quad \begin{aligned} \beta_{r,d}^{\text{race}} &\sim \mathcal{N} \left(0, \sigma_{\text{race}}^2 \right) \text{ for } r \in \{1, 2, 3\} \text{ and } d \in \{1, \dots, 435\} \\ \beta_{a,d}^{\text{age}} &\sim \mathcal{N} \left(0, \sigma_{\text{age}}^2 \right) \text{ for } a \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \text{ and } d \in \{1, \dots, 435\} \\ \beta_{e,d}^{\text{edu}} &\sim \mathcal{N} \left(0, \sigma_{\text{edu}}^2 \right) \text{ for } e \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\} \text{ and } d \in \{1, \dots, 435\} \\ \beta_{g,d}^{\text{gender}} &\sim \mathcal{N} \left(0, \sigma_{\text{gender}}^2 \right) \text{ for } g \in \{0, 1\} \text{ and } d \in \{1, \dots, 435\} \\ \beta_{i,d}^{\text{income}} &\sim \mathcal{N} \left(0, \sigma_{\text{income}}^2 \right) \text{ for } i \in \{1, 2, 3\} \text{ and } d \in \{1, \dots, 435\} \\ \beta_d^{\text{district}} &\sim \mathcal{N} \left(\alpha_{0[d]} + \boldsymbol{\lambda}^T \mathbf{x}_d, \sigma_{\text{district}}^2 \right) \text{ for } d \in \{1, \dots, 435\}, \end{aligned}$$

where, as in Equation (1), each individual-level coefficient in each district is modeled as drawn from a Normal distribution with mean (μ) equal to 0 and a variance parameter (σ^2) to be estimated from data. The parameter $\alpha_{0[d]}$ is the district-specific intercept, $\boldsymbol{\lambda}$ is a vector of coefficients, T denotes the matrix transpose, and \mathbf{x}_d is a vector of district level predictors. As before, I estimate the models for each year and outcome separately using the `stan_glm`

function in [R].

4. **Poststratification** → From the model in (3), I generate the respective posterior distributions of the linear predicted probabilities of respondents' opinion given each demographic-geographic category, which now includes party from the previous step. There is a prediction of mean support for each bill-year within each demographic-geographic category. I calculate the level of support in each race-party-income-district combination by taking the weighted sum of estimated support in each demographic-geographic category. The weights are the proportion of people in a given race-party-income-district unit who fall into each demographic-geographic category. The result is then the average predicted support for each bill-year in each race-party-income-district.

For example, there are 352 demographic-geographic categories in the race-party-income-district of White-Democrat-annual income less than \$30,000-*AK0*. For each one of these categories, the model in Equation (3) predicts mean support. The Census data provides the proportion of people who fall into each of these 352 demographic-geographic categories. The overall mean of support in the race-party-income-district of White-Democrat-annual income less than \$30,000-*AK0* is then the sum of the 352 estimates weighted by the proportion of people in each of the 352 categories.

B CCES Survey Items (2006-2016)

Table 8: Survey Items from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2006-2016

| Issue Area | Survey Item | CCES Year(s) |
|--------------------|---|--------------|
| LGBTQ+ Rights | President Bush recently spoke out in favor of a Constitutional Amendment defining marriage as strictly between a man and a woman. Do you support or oppose a Constitutional amendment banning gay marriage? | 2006 |
| Stem Cell Research | Now we'd like to ask you about whether the federal government should fund stem cell research. Some in Congress argue that this research may lead to cures for diseases and disabilities affecting large numbers of Americans, and should be funded. Others argue that a potential human life has to be destroyed in order to use these cells, and funding it would be unethical. What do you think? If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against federal funds for this research? | 2006, 2008 |
| Foreign Policy | Congress also debated a proposal that the president begin phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq starting this year and submit to Congress by the end of 2006 a plan with estimated dates for continued phased withdrawal. Some politicians argue that setting out a plan to withdraw would make Iraqis take responsibility for their country and become more independent of the U.S. Others argue that it is too early to start withdrawing, and that doing so would make terrorists grow bolder. What do you think? If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against a plan to start withdrawing troops this year? | 2006, 2008 |
| Immigration | Another issue is illegal immigration. One plan considered by the Senate would offer illegal immigrants who already live in the U.S. more opportunities to become legal citizens. Some politicians argue that people who have worked hard in jobs that the economy depends should be offered the chance to live here legally. Other politicians argue that the plan is an amnesty that rewards people who have broken the law. What do you think? If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against this proposal? | 2006, 2012 |
| Minimum Wage | Congress considered a proposal to increase the federal minimum wage from \$5.15 to \$6.25 within the next year and a half. Some politicians argue that the wage should be increased because it hasn't changed since 1997 and many workers still live in poverty. Other politicians argue that raising the wage might force small businesses to cut jobs and would hurt the economy. What do you think? If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against increasing the minimum wage? | 2008 |
| Foreign Policy | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Allow U. S. spy agencies to eavesdrop on overseas terrorist suspects without first getting a court order. | 2008 |
| Health Insurance | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Fund a \$20 billion program to provide health insurance for children in families earning less than \$43,000. | 2008 |

| | | |
|--------------------------|---|------------|
| Financial/Fiscal Policy | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Federal assistance for homeowners facing foreclosure and large lending institutions at risk of failing. | 2008 |
| Financial/Fiscal Policy | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. U.S. Government's \$700 Billion Bank Bailout Plan. | 2008 |
| Affirmative Action | Affirmative action programs give preference to racial minorities and to women in employment and college admissions in order to correct for discrimination. Do you support or oppose affirmative action? | 2008 |
| Financial/Fiscal Policy | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Authorizes \$787 billion in federal spending to stimulate economic growth in the U.S. | 2010 |
| Environmental Protection | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Imposes a cap on carbon emissions and allows companies to trade allowances for carbon emissions. Funds research on renewable energy. | 2010 |
| Health Insurance | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Requires all Americans to obtain health insurance. Allows people to keep current provider. Sets up health insurance option for those without coverage. Increase taxes on those making more than \$280,000 a year. | 2010 |
| Financial/Fiscal Policy | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Protects consumers against abusive lending. Regulates high risk investments known as derivatives. Allows government to shut down failing financial institutions. | 2010 |
| LGBTQ+ Rights | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Would allow gays to serve openly in the armed services. | 2010 |
| Supreme Court | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Appoint Elena Kagan to the U.S. Supreme Court. ⁷ | 2010 |
| Immigration | When it comes to immigration, do you think the U.S. Government should fine U.S. businesses that hire illegal immigrants? | 2012 |
| Financial/Fiscal Policy | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. 2011 House Budget Plan: The budget plan would cut Medicare and Medicaid by 42%. Would reduce debt by 16% by 2020. | 2012 |
| Financial/Fiscal Policy | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Simpson-Bowles Budget Plan: The plan would make 15% cuts across the board in Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Defense, as well as other programs. Eliminate many tax breaks for individuals and corporations. Would reduce debt by 21% by 2020. | 2012, 2014 |

⁷Not voted on in the House, but kept in the dataset for descriptive purposes.

| | | |
|--------------------------|---|------------------|
| Financial/Fiscal Policy | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. The Middle Class Tax Cut Act: Would extend Bush-era tax cuts for incomes below \$200,000. Would increase the budget deficit by an estimated \$250 billion. | 2012 |
| Financial/Fiscal Policy | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. The Tax Hike Prevention Act: Would extend Bush-era tax cuts for all individuals, regardless of income. Would increase the budget deficit by an estimated \$405 billion. | 2012 |
| Reproductive Rights | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Birth Control Exemption: A Bill to let employers and insurers refuse to cover birth control and other health services that violate their religious beliefs. | 2012, 2014 |
| Foreign Policy | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Would remove tariffs on imports and exports between South Korea and the U.S. | 2012 |
| Health Care | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Repeal Affordable Care Act: Would repeal the Affordable Care Act. | 2012, 2014, 2016 |
| Environmental Protection | Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Keystone Pipeline: A bill to approve the Keystone XL pipeline from Montana to Texas and provide for environmental protection and government oversight. | 2012 |
| Immigration | When it comes to immigration, do you think the U.S. Government should increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexico border? | 2012, 2014, 2016 |
| Gun Control | On the issue of gun regulation, are you for or against each of the following? Background checks. | 2014 |
| Reproductive Rights | Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Prohibit abortions after the 20th week of pregnancy. | 2014, 2016 |
| Reproductive Rights | Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Permit abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger. | 2014 |
| Reproductive Rights | Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Prohibit the expenditure of funds authorized or appropriated by federal law for any abortion. | 2014, 2016 |
| Health Care | Would you have voted for the Affordable Care Act if you were in Congress? | 2014 |
| Financial/Fiscal Policy | For each proposal indicate whether you would support it or oppose it. Ryan Budget. Budget plan would cut Medicare and Medicaid by 42%. Would reduce debt by 16% by 2020. | 2014 |
| Financial/Fiscal Policy | For each proposal indicate whether you would support it or oppose it. Debt Ceiling. Allow the US government to borrow funds as needed to meet spending obligations and avoid default on US government bonds. | 2014 |
| Environmental Protection | Do you support or oppose each of the following policies? Environmental Protection Agency regulating carbon emissions | 2014 |
| Environmental Protection | Do you support or oppose each of the following policies? Environmental Protection Agency strengthening enforcement of the Clean Air Act even if it costs U.S. jobs. | 2014 |

| | | |
|--------------------------|---|------------|
| Agriculture | Do you support or oppose each of the following policies? Agriculture Bill. Ends price supports for corn, wheat, sugar and other agricultural products. Creates a federally subsidized crop insurance program. Reauthorizes the food stamp program. | 2014 |
| Privacy | Do you support or oppose each of the following policies? NSA Phone Surveillance. Would block funding of the National Security Agency's program that gathers details of every phone call made by or to a U. S. phone unless the records were part of a specific investigation. | 2014 |
| Education | Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress, would you vote FOR or AGAINST each of the following? Education Reform: Repeal the No Child Left Behind Act. | 2016 |
| Highways | Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress, would you vote FOR or AGAINST each of the following? Highway and Transportation Funding Act. | 2016 |
| Foreign Policy | Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress, would you vote FOR or AGAINST each of the following? Iran Sanctions Act. | 2016 |
| Health Care | Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress, would you vote FOR or AGAINST each of the following? Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act. | 2016 |
| Gun Control | On the issue of gun regulation, do you support or oppose the following proposal? Make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permits. | 2016 |
| Reproductive Rights | Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Allow employers to decline coverage of abortions in insurance plans. | 2014, 2016 |
| Environmental Protection | Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Require a minimum amount of renewable fuels (wind, solar, and hydroelectric) in the generation of electricity even if electricity prices increase somewhat. | 2016 |

C Mean Support for Policy Changes by Race *or* Party

Table 9: Mean Support for Policy Changes by Racial Group (2006-2016)

| | White | Black | Latino | White-Black | White-Latino | Black-Latino |
|--------------------|-------|-------|--------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| 2006 | | | | | | |
| Gay Marriage | 0.440 | 0.347 | 0.385 | 0.093 | 0.055 | -0.038 |
| Stem Cells | 0.631 | 0.693 | 0.601 | -0.062 | 0.030 | 0.092 |
| Iraq Withdrawal | 0.573 | 0.835 | 0.701 | -0.262 | -0.127 | 0.135 |
| Legal Status | 0.337 | 0.401 | 0.551 | -0.063 | -0.213 | -0.150 |
| 2008 | | | | | | |
| Affirmative Action | 0.373 | 0.892 | 0.641 | -0.519 | -0.269 | 0.251 |
| Stem Cells | 0.561 | 0.557 | 0.499 | 0.004 | 0.062 | 0.058 |
| Iraq Withdrawal | 0.489 | 0.800 | 0.628 | -0.315 | -0.140 | 0.172 |
| Minimum Wage | 0.758 | 0.953 | 0.889 | -0.195 | -0.131 | 0.064 |
| Spy Terrorists | 0.578 | 0.400 | 0.525 | 0.178 | 0.053 | -0.125 |
| CHIP | 0.608 | 0.900 | 0.784 | -0.292 | -0.176 | 0.116 |
| Foreclosure | 0.401 | 0.698 | 0.559 | -0.296 | -0.158 | 0.138 |
| Bank Bailout | 0.199 | 0.286 | 0.225 | -0.087 | -0.026 | 0.061 |
| 2010 | | | | | | |
| ARRA | 0.457 | 0.814 | 0.600 | 0.358 | 0.143 | 0.215 |
| Clean Energy | 0.531 | 0.784 | 0.681 | 0.254 | 0.150 | 0.104 |
| Health Reform | 0.453 | 0.845 | 0.624 | 0.391 | 0.170 | 0.221 |
| Financial Reform | 0.654 | 0.887 | 0.760 | 0.234 | 0.106 | 0.127 |
| End DADT | 0.588 | 0.649 | 0.640 | 0.061 | 0.052 | 0.009 |
| Kagan | 0.447 | 0.707 | 0.504 | 0.260 | 0.057 | 0.203 |
| 2012 | | | | | | |
| Ryan Budget | 0.175 | 0.111 | 0.168 | 0.064 | 0.007 | -0.057 |
| Simpson Bowles | 0.476 | 0.418 | 0.441 | 0.058 | 0.035 | -0.023 |
| Tax Cut | 0.605 | 0.545 | 0.571 | 0.060 | 0.034 | -0.026 |
| Tax Hike | 0.251 | 0.184 | 0.227 | 0.067 | 0.024 | -0.043 |
| Birth Control | 0.377 | 0.206 | 0.275 | 0.171 | 0.101 | -0.070 |
| USKFTA | 0.509 | 0.450 | 0.468 | 0.059 | 0.041 | -0.018 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.452 | 0.250 | 0.381 | 0.202 | 0.071 | -0.131 |
| Keystone | 0.736 | 0.687 | 0.701 | 0.050 | 0.036 | -0.014 |
| Legal Status | 0.433 | 0.615 | 0.663 | -0.181 | -0.230 | -0.049 |
| Border Patrols | 0.587 | 0.474 | 0.389 | 0.113 | 0.198 | 0.085 |
| Fine Businesses | 0.656 | 0.459 | 0.376 | 0.197 | 0.280 | 0.083 |
| 2014 | | | | | | |
| Border Patrols | 0.580 | 0.512 | 0.424 | 0.068 | 0.156 | 0.088 |
| Birth Control | 0.395 | 0.250 | 0.334 | 0.146 | 0.062 | -0.084 |
| Support ACA | 0.447 | 0.812 | 0.557 | -0.365 | -0.110 | 0.255 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.539 | 0.275 | 0.486 | 0.264 | 0.054 | -0.211 |
| Background Checks | 0.884 | 0.946 | 0.911 | -0.062 | -0.027 | 0.035 |
| Abortion-20wks | 0.676 | 0.656 | 0.697 | 0.018 | -0.022 | -0.041 |
| Abortion-Rape | 0.472 | 0.555 | 0.605 | -0.083 | -0.133 | -0.050 |
| Abortion-Funds | 0.477 | 0.381 | 0.481 | 0.096 | -0.004 | -0.100 |
| Abortion-Insurance | 0.455 | 0.344 | 0.433 | 0.112 | 0.022 | -0.089 |
| Ryan Budget | 0.194 | 0.117 | 0.200 | 0.077 | -0.005 | -0.082 |
| Simpson Bowles | 0.291 | 0.272 | 0.300 | 0.020 | -0.008 | -0.028 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| Debt Ceiling | 0.474 | 0.604 | 0.456 | -0.130 | 0.018 | 0.148 |
| EPA-Carbon | 0.705 | 0.870 | 0.824 | -0.165 | -0.119 | 0.046 |
| EPA-Clean Air | 0.484 | 0.568 | 0.548 | -0.084 | -0.064 | 0.020 |
| Agriculture | 0.611 | 0.528 | 0.602 | 0.083 | 0.009 | -0.075 |
| NSA-Phones | 0.723 | 0.565 | 0.640 | 0.157 | 0.083 | -0.074 |
| 2016 | | | | | | |
| Freedom Act | 0.747 | 0.766 | 0.733 | -0.020 | 0.014 | 0.034 |
| Education Reform | 0.781 | 0.775 | 0.792 | 0.006 | -0.011 | -0.016 |
| Iran Sanctions | 0.820 | 0.748 | 0.784 | 0.072 | 0.036 | -0.036 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.557 | 0.351 | 0.531 | 0.206 | 0.025 | -0.180 |
| Highways | 0.845 | 0.822 | 0.792 | 0.023 | 0.053 | 0.030 |
| Medicare | 0.691 | 0.641 | 0.674 | 0.049 | 0.017 | -0.033 |
| Border Patrols | 0.529 | 0.397 | 0.366 | 0.131 | 0.163 | 0.032 |
| Concealed Carry | 0.388 | 0.299 | 0.354 | 0.089 | 0.034 | -0.055 |
| Abortion-20wks | 0.610 | 0.615 | 0.668 | -0.005 | -0.058 | -0.053 |
| Abortion-Funds | 0.464 | 0.348 | 0.450 | 0.116 | 0.014 | -0.102 |
| Abortion-Insurance | 0.446 | 0.349 | 0.424 | 0.097 | 0.022 | -0.075 |
| Renewables | 0.646 | 0.682 | 0.689 | -0.036 | -0.043 | -0.007 |

Table 10: Mean Support for Policy Changes by Party (2006-2016)

| | Democrat | Independent | Republican | Dem-Ind | Dem-GOP | Ind-GOP |
|--------------------|----------|-------------|------------|---------|---------|---------|
| 2006 | | | | | | |
| Gay Marriage | 0.172 | 0.399 | 0.822 | 0.227 | 0.650 | 0.423 |
| Stem Cells | 0.839 | 0.660 | 0.315 | 0.179 | 0.524 | 0.345 |
| Iraq Withdrawal | 0.865 | 0.604 | 0.234 | 0.261 | 0.632 | 0.371 |
| Immigration | 0.492 | 0.343 | 0.201 | 0.149 | 0.291 | 0.141 |
| 2008 | | | | | | |
| Affirmative Action | 0.668 | 0.372 | 0.162 | 0.296 | 0.507 | 0.210 |
| Stem Cells | 0.736 | 0.559 | 0.277 | 0.178 | 0.459 | 0.281 |
| Iraq Withdrawal | 0.793 | 0.484 | 0.128 | 0.309 | 0.665 | 0.356 |
| Minimum Wage | 0.944 | 0.763 | 0.524 | 0.181 | 0.419 | 0.238 |
| Spy Terrorists | 0.371 | 0.588 | 0.860 | 0.216 | 0.489 | 0.272 |
| CHIP | 0.859 | 0.609 | 0.311 | 0.251 | 0.549 | 0.298 |
| Foreclosure | 0.583 | 0.363 | 0.262 | 0.220 | 0.322 | 0.102 |
| Bank Bailout | 0.258 | 0.174 | 0.177 | 0.083 | 0.081 | 0.003 |
| 2010 | | | | | | |
| ARRA | 0.864 | 0.434 | 0.137 | 0.430 | 0.727 | 0.297 |
| Clean Energy | 0.869 | 0.514 | 0.260 | 0.355 | 0.609 | 0.254 |
| Health Reform | 0.891 | 0.435 | 0.114 | 0.456 | 0.777 | 0.321 |
| Financial Reform | 0.936 | 0.660 | 0.409 | 0.276 | 0.527 | 0.250 |
| End DADT | 0.851 | 0.579 | 0.304 | 0.272 | 0.547 | 0.275 |
| Kagan | 0.822 | 0.406 | 0.120 | 0.416 | 0.702 | 0.286 |
| 2012 | | | | | | |
| Ryan Budget | 0.087 | 0.194 | 0.322 | 0.108 | 0.236 | 0.128 |
| Simpson Bowles | 0.441 | 0.512 | 0.489 | 0.072 | 0.048 | 0.024 |
| Tax Cut | 0.609 | 0.598 | 0.605 | 0.011 | 0.004 | 0.007 |
| Tax Hike | 0.122 | 0.254 | 0.466 | 0.133 | 0.345 | 0.212 |
| Birth Control | 0.134 | 0.397 | 0.675 | 0.263 | 0.541 | 0.278 |
| USKFTA | 0.476 | 0.498 | 0.534 | 0.023 | 0.058 | 0.035 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.190 | 0.486 | 0.775 | 0.296 | 0.585 | 0.289 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Keystone | 0.609 | 0.758 | 0.898 | 0.149 | 0.289 | 0.140 |
| Legal Status | 0.659 | 0.424 | 0.232 | 0.235 | 0.427 | 0.192 |
| Border Patrols | 0.383 | 0.587 | 0.782 | 0.204 | 0.399 | 0.195 |
| Fine Businesses | 0.466 | 0.667 | 0.745 | 0.201 | 0.278 | 0.077 |
| 2014 | | | | | | |
| Border Patrols | 0.415 | 0.594 | 0.765 | 0.179 | 0.350 | 0.171 |
| Birth Control | 0.161 | 0.420 | 0.700 | 0.260 | 0.539 | 0.279 |
| Support ACA | 0.803 | 0.399 | 0.108 | 0.404 | 0.695 | 0.290 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.246 | 0.578 | 0.871 | 0.332 | 0.625 | 0.293 |
| Background Checks | 0.964 | 0.856 | 0.807 | 0.108 | 0.157 | 0.049 |
| Abortion-20wks | 0.566 | 0.699 | 0.817 | 0.133 | 0.251 | 0.118 |
| Abortion-Rape | 0.400 | 0.507 | 0.617 | 0.106 | 0.216 | 0.110 |
| Abortion-Funds | 0.275 | 0.512 | 0.749 | 0.236 | 0.474 | 0.237 |
| Abortion-Insurance | 0.234 | 0.492 | 0.728 | 0.258 | 0.495 | 0.236 |
| Ryan Budget | 0.089 | 0.216 | 0.391 | 0.127 | 0.302 | 0.175 |
| Simpson Bowles | 0.270 | 0.331 | 0.317 | 0.061 | 0.047 | 0.013 |
| Debt Ceiling | 0.668 | 0.402 | 0.247 | 0.265 | 0.421 | 0.155 |
| EPA-Carbon | 0.916 | 0.678 | 0.470 | 0.238 | 0.447 | 0.208 |
| EPA-Clean Air | 0.690 | 0.451 | 0.227 | 0.239 | 0.463 | 0.225 |
| Agriculture | 0.573 | 0.631 | 0.648 | 0.057 | 0.075 | 0.017 |
| NSA-Phones | 0.670 | 0.720 | 0.680 | 0.050 | 0.010 | 0.039 |
| 2016 | | | | | | |
| Freedom Act | 0.764 | 0.732 | 0.719 | 0.031 | 0.045 | 0.014 |
| Education Reform | 0.784 | 0.788 | 0.764 | 0.004 | 0.019 | 0.024 |
| Iran Sanctions | 0.767 | 0.796 | 0.902 | 0.029 | 0.135 | 0.106 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.297 | 0.602 | 0.881 | 0.304 | 0.583 | 0.279 |
| Highways | 0.875 | 0.820 | 0.782 | 0.055 | 0.093 | 0.038 |
| Medicare | 0.723 | 0.669 | 0.605 | 0.054 | 0.118 | 0.064 |
| Border Patrols | 0.340 | 0.527 | 0.736 | 0.186 | 0.395 | 0.209 |
| Concealed Carry | 0.219 | 0.423 | 0.592 | 0.204 | 0.373 | 0.169 |
| Abortion-20wks | 0.498 | 0.636 | 0.798 | 0.138 | 0.300 | 0.162 |
| Abortion-Funds | 0.282 | 0.485 | 0.725 | 0.203 | 0.443 | 0.240 |
| Abortion-Insurance | 0.260 | 0.469 | 0.703 | 0.210 | 0.443 | 0.234 |
| Renewables | 0.793 | 0.611 | 0.433 | 0.182 | 0.359 | 0.177 |

D Mean Support for Policy Changes by Race *and* Party

Table 11: Mean Support for Policy Changes by Race *within* Party (2006-2016)

| | Democrats | | | Independents | | | Republicans | | |
|--------------------|-----------|-------|--------|--------------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|--------|
| | White | Black | Latino | White | Black | Latino | White | Black | Latino |
| Gay Marriage | 0.153 | 0.232 | 0.165 | 0.381 | 0.514 | 0.415 | 0.816 | 0.888 | 0.838 |
| Stem Cells | 0.864 | 0.788 | 0.797 | 0.685 | 0.556 | 0.568 | 0.331 | 0.220 | 0.231 |
| Iraq Withdrawal | 0.849 | 0.911 | 0.883 | 0.585 | 0.719 | 0.655 | 0.223 | 0.345 | 0.281 |
| Immigration | 0.469 | 0.448 | 0.674 | 0.328 | 0.301 | 0.522 | 0.187 | 0.168 | 0.343 |
| 2006 | | | | | | | | | |
| Affirmative Action | 0.576 | 0.919 | 0.785 | 0.305 | 0.784 | 0.541 | 0.137 | 0.573 | 0.302 |
| Stem Cells | 0.791 | 0.610 | 0.660 | 0.598 | 0.381 | 0.434 | 0.292 | 0.145 | 0.178 |
| Iraq Withdrawal | 0.774 | 0.850 | 0.808 | 0.467 | 0.593 | 0.518 | 0.124 | 0.192 | 0.148 |
| Minimum Wage | 0.931 | 0.970 | 0.961 | 0.739 | 0.871 | 0.836 | 0.506 | 0.706 | 0.643 |
| Spy Terrorists | 0.368 | 0.357 | 0.388 | 0.585 | 0.573 | 0.605 | 0.859 | 0.852 | 0.868 |
| CHIP | 0.832 | 0.928 | 0.896 | 0.577 | 0.778 | 0.701 | 0.295 | 0.518 | 0.417 |
| Foreclosure | 0.532 | 0.719 | 0.645 | 0.333 | 0.530 | 0.445 | 0.249 | 0.427 | 0.345 |
| Bank Bailout | 0.246 | 0.295 | 0.274 | 0.169 | 0.207 | 0.191 | 0.175 | 0.213 | 0.197 |
| 2010 | | | | | | | | | |
| ARRA | 0.847 | 0.916 | 0.883 | 0.414 | 0.579 | 0.490 | 0.132 | 0.231 | 0.172 |
| Clean Energy | 0.860 | 0.881 | 0.903 | 0.501 | 0.546 | 0.600 | 0.252 | 0.292 | 0.340 |
| Health Reform | 0.872 | 0.944 | 0.917 | 0.406 | 0.625 | 0.524 | 0.107 | 0.229 | 0.163 |
| Financial Reform | 0.930 | 0.953 | 0.944 | 0.647 | 0.736 | 0.701 | 0.402 | 0.507 | 0.464 |
| End DADT | 0.877 | 0.750 | 0.862 | 0.598 | 0.391 | 0.567 | 0.309 | 0.163 | 0.287 |
| Kagan | 0.827 | 0.824 | 0.794 | 0.413 | 0.409 | 0.363 | 0.123 | 0.123 | 0.104 |
| 2012 | | | | | | | | | |
| Ryan Budget | 0.082 | 0.097 | 0.108 | 0.189 | 0.217 | 0.240 | 0.317 | 0.355 | 0.392 |
| Simpson Bowles | 0.458 | 0.418 | 0.436 | 0.522 | 0.481 | 0.500 | 0.493 | 0.455 | 0.477 |
| Tax Cut | 0.633 | 0.549 | 0.587 | 0.609 | 0.525 | 0.562 | 0.611 | 0.528 | 0.565 |
| Tax Hike | 0.108 | 0.153 | 0.138 | 0.242 | 0.320 | 0.296 | 0.458 | 0.551 | 0.522 |
| Birth Control | 0.131 | 0.147 | 0.127 | 0.395 | 0.428 | 0.388 | 0.675 | 0.703 | 0.667 |
| USKFTA | 0.495 | 0.447 | 0.465 | 0.508 | 0.460 | 0.479 | 0.539 | 0.489 | 0.510 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.179 | 0.202 | 0.213 | 0.476 | 0.512 | 0.528 | 0.771 | 0.794 | 0.802 |
| Keystone | 0.594 | 0.652 | 0.608 | 0.753 | 0.796 | 0.764 | 0.897 | 0.918 | 0.902 |
| Legal Status | 0.627 | 0.673 | 0.775 | 0.399 | 0.448 | 0.576 | 0.217 | 0.256 | 0.366 |
| Border Patrols | 0.399 | 0.417 | 0.265 | 0.603 | 0.621 | 0.452 | 0.793 | 0.804 | 0.673 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Fine Businesses | 0.529 | 0.412 | 0.289 | 0.706 | 0.599 | 0.465 | 0.769 | 0.673 | 0.545 |
| 2014 | | | | | | | | | |
| Border Patrols | 0.428 | 0.456 | 0.304 | 0.608 | 0.634 | 0.475 | 0.776 | 0.794 | 0.665 |
| Birth Control | 0.154 | 0.180 | 0.161 | 0.415 | 0.458 | 0.428 | 0.698 | 0.732 | 0.706 |
| Support ACA | 0.777 | 0.897 | 0.810 | 0.377 | 0.599 | 0.425 | 0.104 | 0.225 | 0.125 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.251 | 0.197 | 0.274 | 0.579 | 0.502 | 0.607 | 0.870 | 0.830 | 0.883 |
| Background Checks | 0.964 | 0.962 | 0.963 | 0.856 | 0.851 | 0.853 | 0.807 | 0.803 | 0.807 |
| Abortion-20wks | 0.544 | 0.609 | 0.595 | 0.688 | 0.742 | 0.730 | 0.812 | 0.850 | 0.843 |
| Abortion-Rape | 0.340 | 0.505 | 0.509 | 0.469 | 0.635 | 0.639 | 0.597 | 0.742 | 0.744 |
| Abortion-Funds | 0.255 | 0.305 | 0.316 | 0.496 | 0.557 | 0.570 | 0.742 | 0.785 | 0.794 |
| Abortion-Insurance | 0.220 | 0.263 | 0.257 | 0.480 | 0.540 | 0.532 | 0.723 | 0.767 | 0.762 |
| Ryan Budget | 0.082 | 0.099 | 0.121 | 0.206 | 0.241 | 0.285 | 0.381 | 0.430 | 0.495 |
| Simpson Bowles | 0.271 | 0.278 | 0.288 | 0.331 | 0.340 | 0.351 | 0.317 | 0.327 | 0.344 |
| Debt Ceiling | 0.682 | 0.676 | 0.602 | 0.414 | 0.408 | 0.333 | 0.254 | 0.250 | 0.194 |
| EPA-Carbon | 0.910 | 0.918 | 0.940 | 0.664 | 0.688 | 0.753 | 0.457 | 0.488 | 0.570 |
| EPA-Clean Air | 0.706 | 0.634 | 0.708 | 0.459 | 0.379 | 0.462 | 0.228 | 0.175 | 0.232 |
| Agriculture | 0.589 | 0.523 | 0.578 | 0.638 | 0.575 | 0.628 | 0.651 | 0.589 | 0.642 |
| NSA-Phones | 0.717 | 0.560 | 0.618 | 0.745 | 0.595 | 0.651 | 0.695 | 0.537 | 0.597 |
| 2016 | | | | | | | | | |
| Freedom Act | 0.763 | 0.770 | 0.758 | 0.733 | 0.740 | 0.727 | 0.719 | 0.726 | 0.712 |
| Education Reform | 0.784 | 0.776 | 0.790 | 0.788 | 0.780 | 0.794 | 0.764 | 0.755 | 0.770 |
| Iran Sanctions | 0.780 | 0.724 | 0.741 | 0.803 | 0.751 | 0.767 | 0.904 | 0.874 | 0.883 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.286 | 0.280 | 0.349 | 0.591 | 0.585 | 0.659 | 0.877 | 0.874 | 0.905 |
| Highways | 0.895 | 0.841 | 0.834 | 0.838 | 0.762 | 0.754 | 0.795 | 0.707 | 0.696 |
| Medicare | 0.746 | 0.659 | 0.714 | 0.683 | 0.586 | 0.646 | 0.612 | 0.511 | 0.576 |
| Border Patrols | 0.359 | 0.345 | 0.246 | 0.545 | 0.529 | 0.412 | 0.748 | 0.735 | 0.631 |
| Concealed Carry | 0.210 | 0.249 | 0.222 | 0.417 | 0.468 | 0.433 | 0.589 | 0.636 | 0.604 |
| Abortion-20wks | 0.459 | 0.567 | 0.558 | 0.614 | 0.712 | 0.703 | 0.789 | 0.853 | 0.847 |
| Abortion-Funds | 0.266 | 0.306 | 0.315 | 0.473 | 0.522 | 0.531 | 0.719 | 0.756 | 0.762 |
| Abortion-Insurance | 0.245 | 0.289 | 0.286 | 0.458 | 0.514 | 0.510 | 0.697 | 0.741 | 0.738 |
| Renewables | 0.811 | 0.724 | 0.806 | 0.623 | 0.503 | 0.615 | 0.437 | 0.324 | 0.434 |

Table 12: Within-Party Differences between Racial Groups in Mean Support for Policy Changes

| | Democrats | | | Independents | | | Republicans | | |
|--------------------|-------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| | White-Black | White-Lat. | Black-Lat. | White-Black | White-Lat. | Black-Lat. | White-Black | White-Lat. | Black-Lat. |
| 2006 | | | | | | | | | |
| Gay Marriage | 0.079 | 0.011 | 0.068 | 0.134 | 0.035 | 0.099 | 0.072 | 0.022 | 0.050 |
| Stem Cells | 0.076 | 0.067 | 0.009 | 0.129 | 0.118 | 0.012 | 0.111 | 0.100 | 0.011 |
| Iraq Withdrawal | 0.062 | 0.034 | 0.028 | 0.134 | 0.070 | 0.064 | 0.122 | 0.058 | 0.064 |
| Immigration | 0.022 | 0.205 | 0.227 | 0.026 | 0.194 | 0.220 | 0.019 | 0.156 | 0.175 |
| 2008 | | | | | | | | | |
| Affirmative Action | 0.344 | 0.209 | 0.135 | 0.480 | 0.236 | 0.244 | 0.436 | 0.165 | 0.271 |
| Stem Cells | 0.181 | 0.131 | 0.050 | 0.217 | 0.164 | 0.053 | 0.147 | 0.115 | 0.032 |
| Iraq Withdrawal | 0.076 | 0.034 | 0.043 | 0.125 | 0.051 | 0.074 | 0.068 | 0.024 | 0.043 |
| Minimum Wage | 0.039 | 0.030 | 0.009 | 0.132 | 0.097 | 0.035 | 0.200 | 0.137 | 0.063 |
| Spy Terrorists | 0.012 | 0.020 | 0.031 | 0.011 | 0.020 | 0.032 | 0.007 | 0.009 | 0.016 |
| CHIP | 0.096 | 0.063 | 0.033 | 0.201 | 0.124 | 0.077 | 0.224 | 0.123 | 0.101 |
| Foreclosure | 0.188 | 0.114 | 0.074 | 0.196 | 0.112 | 0.085 | 0.178 | 0.096 | 0.082 |
| Bank Bailout | 0.049 | 0.028 | 0.021 | 0.037 | 0.021 | 0.016 | 0.038 | 0.022 | 0.016 |
| 2010 | | | | | | | | | |
| ARRA | 0.069 | 0.036 | 0.033 | 0.165 | 0.076 | 0.089 | 0.099 | 0.041 | 0.058 |
| Clean Energy | 0.020 | 0.042 | 0.022 | 0.045 | 0.099 | 0.054 | 0.040 | 0.088 | 0.048 |
| Health Reform | 0.072 | 0.045 | 0.027 | 0.219 | 0.117 | 0.102 | 0.122 | 0.056 | 0.066 |
| Financial Reform | 0.023 | 0.014 | 0.008 | 0.088 | 0.054 | 0.035 | 0.105 | 0.062 | 0.043 |
| End DADT | 0.127 | 0.015 | 0.112 | 0.208 | 0.031 | 0.177 | 0.146 | 0.022 | 0.125 |
| Kagan | 0.003 | 0.033 | 0.030 | 0.005 | 0.051 | 0.046 | 0.000 | 0.018 | 0.018 |
| 2012 | | | | | | | | | |
| Ryan Budget | 0.015 | 0.026 | 0.011 | 0.028 | 0.052 | 0.023 | 0.039 | 0.075 | 0.037 |
| Simpson Bowles | 0.039 | 0.022 | 0.018 | 0.040 | 0.021 | 0.019 | 0.039 | 0.016 | 0.023 |
| Tax Cut | 0.083 | 0.046 | 0.037 | 0.084 | 0.047 | 0.037 | 0.083 | 0.046 | 0.037 |
| Tax Hike | 0.045 | 0.031 | 0.014 | 0.078 | 0.055 | 0.024 | 0.093 | 0.064 | 0.029 |
| Birth Control | 0.017 | 0.003 | 0.020 | 0.032 | 0.007 | 0.040 | 0.028 | 0.008 | 0.036 |
| USKFTA | 0.047 | 0.030 | 0.018 | 0.049 | 0.030 | 0.019 | 0.050 | 0.029 | 0.021 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.023 | 0.034 | 0.011 | 0.036 | 0.052 | 0.016 | 0.022 | 0.031 | 0.009 |
| Keystone | 0.058 | 0.015 | 0.043 | 0.043 | 0.011 | 0.032 | 0.020 | 0.005 | 0.015 |
| Legal Status | 0.046 | 0.148 | 0.102 | 0.049 | 0.177 | 0.128 | 0.039 | 0.149 | 0.111 |
| Border Patrols | 0.018 | 0.134 | 0.152 | 0.017 | 0.151 | 0.169 | 0.011 | 0.120 | 0.131 |
| Fine Businesses | 0.117 | 0.239 | 0.123 | 0.107 | 0.241 | 0.134 | 0.095 | 0.224 | 0.128 |

| 2014 | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Border Patrols | 0.028 | 0.124 | 0.152 | 0.026 | 0.134 | 0.160 | 0.018 | 0.110 | 0.128 |
| Birth Control | 0.025 | 0.007 | 0.018 | 0.043 | 0.013 | 0.030 | 0.034 | 0.008 | 0.026 |
| Support ACA | 0.121 | 0.034 | 0.087 | 0.222 | 0.048 | 0.174 | 0.121 | 0.021 | 0.100 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.054 | 0.023 | 0.078 | 0.077 | 0.029 | 0.106 | 0.040 | 0.013 | 0.053 |
| Background Checks | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.000 | 0.004 |
| Abortion-20wks | 0.065 | 0.052 | 0.014 | 0.055 | 0.042 | 0.012 | 0.038 | 0.030 | 0.008 |
| Abortion-Rape | 0.165 | 0.169 | 0.004 | 0.166 | 0.170 | 0.004 | 0.145 | 0.147 | 0.002 |
| Abortion-Funds | 0.050 | 0.061 | 0.011 | 0.061 | 0.074 | 0.013 | 0.043 | 0.052 | 0.009 |
| Abortion-Insurance | 0.044 | 0.038 | 0.006 | 0.059 | 0.051 | 0.008 | 0.044 | 0.039 | 0.005 |
| Ryan Budget | 0.017 | 0.040 | 0.023 | 0.035 | 0.080 | 0.045 | 0.049 | 0.114 | 0.065 |
| Simpson Bowles | 0.007 | 0.017 | 0.010 | 0.008 | 0.019 | 0.011 | 0.010 | 0.027 | 0.017 |
| Debt Ceiling | 0.006 | 0.080 | 0.074 | 0.007 | 0.081 | 0.074 | 0.005 | 0.060 | 0.056 |
| EPA-Carbon | 0.008 | 0.030 | 0.022 | 0.024 | 0.088 | 0.064 | 0.031 | 0.113 | 0.082 |
| EPA-Clean Air | 0.072 | 0.003 | 0.075 | 0.080 | 0.003 | 0.083 | 0.053 | 0.003 | 0.056 |
| Agriculture | 0.065 | 0.011 | 0.054 | 0.063 | 0.010 | 0.053 | 0.062 | 0.009 | 0.053 |
| NSA-Phones | 0.157 | 0.099 | 0.058 | 0.150 | 0.095 | 0.055 | 0.158 | 0.097 | 0.061 |
| 2016 | | | | | | | | | |
| Freedom Act | 0.007 | 0.006 | 0.012 | 0.008 | 0.005 | 0.013 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.014 |
| Education Reform | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.014 | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.014 | 0.008 | 0.007 | 0.015 |
| Iran Sanctions | 0.056 | 0.039 | 0.017 | 0.052 | 0.036 | 0.016 | 0.030 | 0.021 | 0.009 |
| Repeal ACA | 0.006 | 0.063 | 0.069 | 0.006 | 0.068 | 0.074 | 0.003 | 0.028 | 0.032 |
| Highways | 0.054 | 0.061 | 0.007 | 0.075 | 0.084 | 0.009 | 0.087 | 0.098 | 0.011 |
| Medicare | 0.086 | 0.031 | 0.055 | 0.097 | 0.037 | 0.060 | 0.101 | 0.036 | 0.065 |
| Border Patrols | 0.014 | 0.113 | 0.099 | 0.016 | 0.133 | 0.117 | 0.013 | 0.117 | 0.103 |
| Concealed Carry | 0.038 | 0.012 | 0.026 | 0.051 | 0.016 | 0.035 | 0.046 | 0.014 | 0.032 |
| Abortion-20wks | 0.108 | 0.099 | 0.010 | 0.098 | 0.089 | 0.009 | 0.064 | 0.058 | 0.006 |
| Abortion-Funds | 0.040 | 0.049 | 0.008 | 0.049 | 0.059 | 0.010 | 0.037 | 0.044 | 0.007 |
| Abortion-Insurance | 0.044 | 0.041 | 0.003 | 0.056 | 0.053 | 0.003 | 0.044 | 0.041 | 0.003 |
| Renewables | 0.087 | 0.005 | 0.082 | 0.120 | 0.008 | 0.112 | 0.113 | 0.004 | 0.109 |